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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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the promise of a rich and fertile land for the people who live there.

But when I look back on our common history since World War II, what I'm impressed with is not the troubles or the problems—the world has always had those. I'm impressed with the new element in international relations: the steady effort, crystallized in our mutual development programs, our aid programs, by independent countries to work together on solving problems.

That is new, and different, and a cause for optimism.

For our part, I can assure you that we approach our role in the development partnership in the same way we have learned to view our investment in the development of our own cities. We don't see this as something we are doing for somebody else. We see it as an investment in our own future and in the world we share with you.

In closing, may I say this: The American character is one of activism and, sometimes, impatience. It is one which leads us, from time to time, into mistakes. It is one, I am sure, which is often not fully understood in other places.

But I want to leave this message with you: We Americans are committed—committed beyond recall—to the building of a freer, better, happier world for all men.

There have been times, I know, when you may have doubted this. But today, as never before, our American Nation has come to appreciate the oneness of mankind. This appreciation makes possible the great national programs we undertake today to build better cities, to fight poverty, to eliminate discrimination in our own society, to do something on behalf of our fellow men.

And today, as never before, we know that we cannot live rich in a world too long poor.

I, for one, mean to do in my lifetime whatever I can to extend mankind's benefits to more of mankind. And I am joined by the overwhelming majority of the American people. I am joined, certainly, by our President.

Let us, then, together pledge ourselves to creating the world of justice, hope and peace that all men long for, but have not yet achieved.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

AMENDMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 2580) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the bill.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2580).

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], who is to be recognized to make some remarks at this time, will yield without losing the right to the floor or having the time for the quorum call taken out of the time allotted to him, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Ohio.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, on the floor of the Senate within the last few days there has been a discussion of what the conditions were in the Dominican Republic in April, when the U.S. Government determined to send in its Marines. A statement was made that an erroneous judgment was reached by the President because he was misinformed as to the purpose in sending in the troops. I must express vigorous disagreement with that argument.

I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and had the opportunity of listening to the representatives of the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the CIA in describing what took place in the Dominican Republic when the revolt of last spring began.

I can say unhesitatingly to Senators on the floor of the Senate that the proof was clear and convincing that unless we had stepped in we would have at our shores another Cuba.

We know of the difficulties that are facing us because of Cuba. In my judgment, those difficulties would be multiplied many times if another Castro and Cuba were established within 100 miles of the banks of our land on the south.

When the coup began it was led by persons who were not connected with the Communist Party. But it is an established fact that there were three groups in Cuba.

One group was known as the 14th of June movement with complete fidelity to Castro. Its members obtained guerrilla training in Cuba, especially in the year of 1964. That group is oriented to Castro and is Communist. It is the largest of the extremists parties, but does contain some non-Communist members.

The second group, that was latent and hidden in the Dominican Republic, was the PSPD, oriented to Moscow. Its members received training in Czechoslovakia in 1963. Others obtained indoctrination in Moscow in 1964.

Then, there was a third group, the APCJ, oriented to Peiping. Members of the APCJ went to Communist China late in 1964, where they received guerrilla military training.

We thus have the situation with three groups in the Dominican Republic led by Communists, with some of their members non-Communists. They were hidden, waiting for action. When the coup began, they immediately sprung to the forefront, and within a few days they were occupying the leading positions in what was happening.

When the military members of the coup began distributing arms, these three Communist oriented organizations were in the frontline. Their leaders

were distributing military equipment, and they were seen at vital places in command. All of the indications were that they were practically in control.

Military equipment was delivered to them in large quantities and taken to their headquarters, where it was distributed to their members, many of whom were Communists, and others who did not know exactly what was in the making.

There has been some criticism, particularly in the press, about the relatively small number of Communists identified as having taken part in the rebellion in the Dominican Republic.

In my judgment we miss the seriousness of the revolutionary situation by adding up the number of Communists that were identified in it.

When we add the number, we completely miss the point about the ability of Communist leaders to dominate a situation where disorder, rioting, and mob rule prevails. By skilled manipulation, propaganda, by assertion of leadership in proper points, in street fighting, by aggressive activity, these Communists take hold. That is what they did in the Dominican Republic.

A few skilled people can do this in the proper circumstances. In the Dominican Republic the circumstances were existent, enabling the Communists to seize the leadership, and to install their government.

When a temporary government was established in April, in charge of the investigative forces, there was placed at its head the most ardent Communist of the whole group.

That is a technique of Communist activity which is generally understood: Get control of the police; get control of the investigating agency; and when there is control of them, begin arresting all citizens who are in disagreement with the party in control who have the potential ability of interfering.

I merely want to remind Senators of what has happened in Cuba. Castro immediately arrested 500 of the leaders whom he thought would cause trouble to him. He had a hippodrome trial. The 500 persons were put to death under the semblance of the administration of justice, when it was nothing but the act of a tyrant, giving the semblance of a trial to the accused, with all judgments foreordained, and then putting them to death.

I have already stated that the man that was placed at the head of the investigative forces was one of the leading Communists in the Dominican Republic.

But one word about the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. They were called by the chairman of the committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. The committee did not make the decision to hold the hearings.

I regret to say this, but it is nevertheless my judgment, that the meeting was contemplated to establish that we were in the Dominican Republic by error and injustice.

Someone had prepared a sheaf of cards, I should say 1½ inches thick. When the witnesses appeared, the questions on the cards were systematically

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asked. One question was read, and the card was turned over. Then the second question was read, and the third. I should say that 150 cards were in the sheaf. Every question contained implications about the impropriety of the presence of the United States in the Dominican Republic.

During the hearing, I complained about what was taking place. One of the questions asked was: "Did not Mr. X, of Y newspaper make this statement?" The statement of Mr. X made had challenged the presence of the United States in the Dominican Republic. I intervened and asked, "Is it not also true that another newspaperman during the Cuban episode, said that Castro was a Lincoln and a Robin Hood, devoted to the cause of the poor, robbing the rich, and turning his gains over to those who were in need?"

Certain newspapermen have said that we were improperly in Cuba and in the Dominican Republic. But our plight in Cuba, in my opinion, is the primary consequence of a miscalculation we made of Castro. Castro came to the United States and was given the dignity of appearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. I deliberately did not attend that meeting. I could not dignify Castro's appearance before the Committee on Foreign Relations, having in my mind the knowledge of the circus trial that he had conducted.

Castro was a guest of the National Press Club. During the entire time he was here, the stories told about him were, in effect, that to Cuba had come a messiah gifted with charitable qualities; a friend of the free West; a friend of the United States. We took those stories as true. The result is the problem which now exists in Cuba.

I am firmly of the conviction that if the President had not acted as he did in April of this year, we now would have practically at our shores another Cuba. I cannot agree with the statements made by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT] on the floor of the Senate on September 15. I do not believe that I am what may be called a hard realist; but I do not want to be labeled as a soft-minded idealist, one who is absolutely indifferent to realistic facts. I would feel myself to be a dupe if I daily believed what the Communists of the world are saying. The Communists have their techniques. They know how to operate subversively. They know how to foment riots. They are fomenting them in the United States. All that is needed is some small disorder followed by an invasion of well-equipped technicians who know how to exaggerate a situation; and before one knows it, mobs are in action. It was mobs that took charge of the Dominican Republic uprising.

I say to the people of my State that while I have agreed with many of the things that have been recommended by

the administration on this subject, I now stand foursquare behind what was done. I do so in the belief that it was serviceable as a security to our country and to the free world.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. First, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Ohio for the presentation he has made today. As a Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I have watched, listened, and read with more than uncommon interest the discussions emanating from the other side of the aisle concerning the activities in which the United States was engaged in the Dominican Republic, and the criticisms and replies which have been made with respect to that action.

While I dislike to inject myself into what is pretty much a Democratic discussion, it does, after all, relate to hearings which were held in the Committee on Foreign Relations. I attended most of the hearings. They involved a rather searching analysis of what transpired in the early days of revolutionary activities in Santo Domingo and other parts of the Dominican Republic. I was curious about the nature of the hearings and the reasons for them, because, while I was in attendance for many hours, I heard no questions directed to the long series of witnesses as to what they felt our future policy should be or what they felt the solution ought to be, so far as the aftermath of the revolutionary period was concerned.

It all seemed to be a questioning in a somewhat critical search for knowledge as to why we got into the affair in the first place; whether we got in with the right number of people and at the right time; and whether the information that caused us to go in at all was accurate or inaccurate. The inquiry seemed to be principally a contest as to whether the writings of little men in the employ of big newspapers was correct so far as the situation in Santo Domingo was concerned; and whether the reports from the CIA, the State Department, and the OAS were accurate.

At the end of the hearings, I felt completely convinced, as did the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], that all the verities and all the facts seemed to be with the representatives of the Department of State and the American Government, rather than in the proclamations being made by the little men who were writing for big newspapers.

I concurred in and completely supported emphatically the action of President Johnson and the actions of the State Department, so far as their immediate reaction to the situation in the Dominican Republic was concerned. I believe they did the right thing in the right place at the right time with the right number of military personnel.

I am inclined to question a little some

of the latter day activities of the Government so far as they relate to problems existing in the Dominican Republic. I dislike to see my Government connected with a so-called kidnapping operation, in which one of the valiant fighters for freedom, Wessin y Wessin, was rather forcibly removed from the land of his origin and transferred to American soil.

As I understand the facts, he walked to the plane which took him out of the Dominican Republic. However, he walked reluctantly and involuntarily, and apparently with a bayonet which bore the imprimatur "made in the United States" at his back.

I dislike to see our Government injecting itself to that degree and in that manner in an activity which was certainly pleasing to the revolutionaries of the Dominican Republic and pleasing to the Communists. I am not a great advocate of Wessin y Wessin. I do not know how good a military leader he was. He would not be my candidate for President of the Dominican Republic if I were sitting at a political convention selecting nominees.

I should think that, slowly but surely, Uncle Sam would be learning that we do not make very many good guesses when we inject ourselves in that fashion and that forcefully into the internal affairs of another country. We should have learned something, I should think, from our experiences in Vietnam when we were permitting or promoting the ousting of Diem. We have never since then found a successor who seemed to have the capacity to develop the loyalty of his followers and fellow citizens that Diem possessed.

My skepticism is enhanced when I reflect that, with respect to Tshombe in the Congo, we spent much time, effort, and money in apparently kicking him out. Then, after we had created a vacuum, we spent much time, effort, and money in bringing him back. We were certainly wrong in either one instance or in the other so far as Tshombe in the Congo was concerned.

The Senator from Ohio pointed out that, in the situation in Cuba, while we were making a transfer from Batista, who was bad, to Castro, who was worse, there was an apparent failure on the part of American officials generally to recognize that we were permitting or promoting there the control of Cuba by a Communist who had been trained in Communist training camps and who was completely dedicated to the Communist cause and subservient to the Russian Communist whiplash.

I am not at all sure that this administration is acting wisely or prudently or properly in conjunction with the Dominican Republic situation, since we took the initial action and since we put down the resolution and stabilized the situation. If, in fact, we are now to have a coalition government in Santo Domingo, we shall have failed to have secured the dividend which should have been available from

the very wise and prudent and proper action which President Johnson originally took. I am not charging that we are going to do that. I am concerned about the way in which we moved in on Wessin y Wessin. It is a straw in the wind because of the indication that the little writers for the big newspapers are having influence with people in big places in Washington.

I dislike to see that kind of indication. We should make sure that the people in the Dominican Republic have a democratically inclined, freedom-loving friend of freedom as their leader, and we should not dilute his capacity for success by making further concessions to the defeated Communist influences in that revolution.

Primarily I am glad that the distinguished Senator from Ohio has helped to set the record straight. He has related accurately what transpired in the Committee on Foreign Relations, in my opinion. I saw no evidence throughout the hearings to indicate that President Johnson had acted either inadvisedly or on inadequate information in making the decisions that he made in those early critical days.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I do not want my statement to be construed as indicating approval or disapproval of what has recently happened. I have not had an opportunity to learn from the State Department what has taken place. However, I have apprehension about the removal of Wessin y Wessin. At this time, I should like to read some notes which I made when Bosch's government was overthrown several years ago. These are my notes concerning General Wessin y Wessin:

Wessin is about 33 years old. He was active in trying to drive the Trujillos and the Communists out of the army of the Dominican Republic. He wanted to raise the moral fabric of the army. He wrote an article pointing out the infiltration into the army of Communists. He is still the head of the Aviation School of the Military Division. He was a colonel and is now a general. He could have been the head of the government, but he declined.

These notes were written at the time of the Bosch overthrow. They wanted him to take the headship and he declined. To me that is testimony of great weight in showing the character of the man. Yet he is the one who was taken out of the Dominican Republic with a bayonet at his back and is now in Miami.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I am glad that the Senator gave that additional information concerning Wessin y Wessin.

As I say, I am not one of his advocates. I do not know enough about him. However, I do know that when a great many of the other military people were fleeing,

he was fighting. He was standing up. He stepped into the critical breach, precisely as the U.S. Government stepped into the breach at a critical time, and together they set back the Communists.

I do not like to reward that kind of fighting for freedom by having my government associate itself with a movement to kidnap him and take him out of the country and send him to the United States against his will.

That is far different from saying that we should put him in high office. However, that kind of concession to the Communist groups who dislike him is a failure to show the kind of stamina and stature now that was properly shown at the time the revolution began.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the notes which I made were based upon testimony given by Government witnesses—witnesses from the State Department primarily. I have these notes here. It can be readily seen that they are merely scribbled memorandums of what was said.

The Government stood firm last April. I do not know whether it is now beginning to yield to the attacks that are being made. I hope that it is not.

A coalition government which is friendly to the West will not survive. The Communists would take over in due time in the event a coalition government were established.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield about 13 minutes to me without losing his right to the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAUSCHE in the chair). Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Montana?

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE DISCUSSION OF DOMINICAN SITUATION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there has been a good deal of discussion about the situation in the Dominican Republic. The distinguished Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has, on the basis of an analysis of hearings held before his committee, made a speech in which he gave his views on the developments inherent in the early days preceding and following our involvement.

Senator FULBRIGHT was very careful to stress that the material on which he based his speech was testimony heard by the Foreign Relations Committee. Unfortunately, except for a 15-minute interval, I was unable to attend these hear-

ings and, furthermore, I have not had the time to read the testimony, so I am unable to comment on the hearings.

There have been exceptions taken to as well as support of FULBRIGHT's remarks by various Members of the Senate. I think it should be pointed out that the chairman of the committee stated emphatically that what he said represented his own views, based on his understanding of the hearings.

As one who participated in the White House conferences on the subject of intervening in the Dominican Republic, I do not intend to say anything specific as to what went on at the meeting. But I feel that in view of the developments which have occurred over the past day or so, that it is appropriate to comment in general terms. When the difficulty occurred, the President did call the leadership and ranking members of certain committees to the White House to discuss what had happened and was happening in the Dominican Republic. He did state that there were 5,000 nationals of foreign countries in Santo Domingo of whom 1,500 were Americans. He had received urgent requests and pleas from the chiefs of the various American agencies and I believe from some foreign embassies stating that the situation was extremely dangerous and he was told that if steps were not undertaken to insure the safety of these nationals that there could well be a substantial loss of life. There was no other country prepared or capable of giving the protection which was needed at the time except the United States. The President had to make a decision involving the safety of these nationals on the basis of the cables, telephone calls, and advice which he had received. When he announced his decision at the White House Conference there was no opposition raised at that time on the matter which was discussed in great detail.

The President, on the basis of his authority as Commander in Chief and his constitutional responsibility as President in the field of foreign policy, undertook to land military forces to protect these nationals. He selected a most capable man in the person of Lieutenant General Palmer to take command of the American Forces in Santo Domingo, and he laid the matter repeatedly before the OAS as an organization. Prior to that, he had brought it to the personal attention of as many Ambassadors of the American nations as could be contacted. He was desirous, at the earliest opportunity, of shelving the initial unilateral responsibility which the United States had undertaken and gave his wholehearted support to the creation of an Inter-American Police Force. He agreed, without hesitation, to a Brazilian becoming the overall commander of this force and the placing of General Palmer in a subordinate position under him.

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He dispatched various missions to try and bring the opposing groups together.

Finally, in the past 2 weeks, the OAS committee, which included Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker of the United States, was able to bring about a creation of an interim and provisional government under Hector Garcia Godoy. This interim government is to remain in power for 9 months. There is to be a 6-month period to try and bring some degree of stability to the Republic and in the last 3 months of the 9-month period, political campaigns are to be undertaken by means of which the Dominican people will be given the opportunity, it is hoped, to elect a government of their own choice.

All the obstacles have not been removed in the Dominican Republic, and I am of the opinion that in this uneasy though encouraging situation, there may yet be further trouble of one kind or another. However, I do think that significant progress has been made and I know that the President is very hopeful that it will be possible to reduce the OAS force still further as the Dominicans achieve a greater degree of stability. Certainly, it is his deepest desire that the situation will be ironed out so that the Dominicans themselves can assume, at the earliest moment, full control of their own affairs.

This has been a most difficult and delicate situation in which the President found himself and he has done his very best, on the basis of advice he has received, to bring the matter to a head. I feel that we owe him a debt of thanks for what he has been able to accomplish and to the OAS for what it has been able to bring about in a way of a reasonable agreement looking to a secure future for the Dominican people.

I would certainly underscore what the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has time and again said, that the President's decisions were fully understandable in the light of the circumstances as they were brought to his attention. I feel, also, that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee was endeavoring to present to the Senate a thoughtful analysis of the views which he distilled from the hearings before his committee. An analysis of the circumstances surrounding major foreign policy decisions is of concern to the Senate and out of this can come constructive reactions from Senators which could well be useful in the field of foreign policy in the future. There has been some strenuous debate on the Dominican situation in this Chamber and there may well be more in the future.

In my opinion, the important thing at the moment is to recognize the fact that at long last, after a period of months, what looks like a lead to the solution has been worked out for the Dominican Republic and that solution was arrived at by the Organization of the Amer-

ican States in which we participated as a full member. A provisional government has been established. An interim President is in office. There has, according to available reports and to the best of my knowledge, been a general laying down of arms. The decision now is up to the Dominican people and the provisional government for the time being to adjust themselves to this situation to prepare for elections 9 months hence, and to establish a government based on the will of the people which can furnish and which can bring a degree of stability and economic prosperity to the Dominicans themselves. The United States has spent a large amount of money to aid in the rehabilitation of the Republic. It is prepared to continue to help if the Dominican people themselves take control of their own state and guide it to anchor in fairly calm political and economic waters. To that end the President has pledged his full support to the efforts of the OAS and I feel quite certain that the American people and their representatives in the Congress support him fully.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. I completely commend the statement of the distinguished Senator from Montana. I do not see how the President could have done anything except intervene. I believe he showed firmness in his handling of foreign relations which should commend him to the entire Nation.

I wish to make an additional point: I know he had tried before intervention to persuade the OAS to move. Apparently it moved too slowly. Since intervention, he has continued that effort. I am greatly heartened by the apparent activation, within OAS, of direct participation by many nations in the peace-keeping procedure, which for the first time, as I have observed that fine organization, indicates its willingness to come to grips with serious problems in various parts of the hemisphere.

I believe that from the leadership of the President, from his urging of the OAS, and from his taking unilateral leadership for a few days as the situation required, there will come a reactivation and rejuvenation of the OAS which will be of great importance to the entire hemisphere. His action will eventually commend itself to peace-loving people throughout the hemisphere as a wise act, because it brought about results so long desired, and only now about to be achieved.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Montana has made a forthright and fair presentation of the

situation as it prevailed in the Dominican Republic in April and as it prevails today.

I have had very little correspondence from those on either side of the situation. I have received only about 50 letters, some condemning the President for the action he took and others commanding him. The letters indicated that the writers really were not in possession of the facts and did not know exactly what the situation was. I personally believe that the President was warranted in sending forces into the Dominican Republic on the night when the rebellion started.

I also believe, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has stated, that the President received some rather poor advice, that plenty of mistakes were made, and that it probably took much longer to restore order in the Dominican Republic than would have been necessary had certain mistakes not been made.

Now, however, the OAS has accomplished its purpose. It is providing for the setting up of a government to be established by the people of the Dominican Republic themselves, and I hope that we shall not undertake to interfere with the setting up of that government, unless it actually threatens the security of the United States, which I doubt it will do.

If I were a Communist from a foreign country, looking for a place in the Western Hemisphere to locate from where I could work with safety, I would never have chosen the Dominican Republic. I believe that to be about the worst place a Communist could find anywhere for his purposes. If I were looking, I believe there would be many cities in the United States which would be more likely places than the Dominican Republic was at the time of the rebellion.

However, I believe that if the people of that Republic desire to set up a government of their own which is progressive and forward-looking, even though it meets with the disapproval of certain interested parties, we should support them and work through the Organization of American States as far as we possibly can.

I believe that the situation now is such that we can safely conclude that the Dominican Republic is going to establish its own Government, and that it will be a government with which we can work, one which will improve the economy and the security of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont and the distinguished Senator from Florida for what they both had to say. I join them in expressing hope that the Organization of American States will become a stronger, more efficient, and more effective organization in the weeks, months and years ahead.

The distinguished Senator from Vermont was at that fateful meeting in the White House when the President informed us of the situation then developing in the Dominican Republic. Because we are both bound by the executive nature of the meeting, we cannot say too much, but we were aware of what happened at the time, and we both gave our full endorsement to the policy undertaken in connection with the President's announcement to us in the Cabinet Room.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, let me express the hope I expressed for the Dominican Republic, that it will apply to all the Latin American countries in the Western Hemisphere. I do not believe that we should undertake to dictate to them just what kind of government they should live under, or whom they should have to head that government so long as it does not actually threaten the security of the United States.

I am still not convinced that what went on in the Dominican Republic in April threatened the security of the United States. It seemed to me that there would have been more bloodshed during that rebellion had the President not intervened. However, as I said before, I believe that he received some advice, as has been pointed out by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, which caused us to make more mistakes than we otherwise might have made, and which delayed plans for the establishment of a popular government in that country.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, to some extent the discussion relates to events in the past.

Now we are faced with the present. It seems as though there is a good possibility—although nothing is sure in this world any more—of a reasonably good government coming out of the situation in the Dominican Republic.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [MR. KENNEDY] for yielding to me, and if he will allow me just this once, to suggest the absence of a quorum, without his losing the right to the floor, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRIS in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its

reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9221) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes; that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 16 and 31 to the bill and concurred therein, and that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 8, 10, 24, and 62 to the bill, and concurred therein, severally with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10323) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the Vice President:

H.R. 948. An act to amend part II of the District of Columbia Code relating to divorce, legal separation, and annulment of marriage in the District of Columbia;

H.R. 5883. An act to amend the bonding provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 and the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act;

H.R. 10014. An act to amend the act of July 2, 1954, relating to office space in the districts of Members of the House of Representatives, and the act of June 27, 1956, relating to office space in the States of Senators; and

H.R. 10874. An act to amend the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 and the Railroad Retirement Tax Act to eliminate certain provisions which reduce spouses' annuities, to provide coverage for tips, to increase the base on which railroad retirement benefits and taxes are computed, and to change the railroad retirement tax rates.

AMENDMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2580) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, the bill we are considering today accomplishes major reforms in our immigration policy. This bill is not

concerned with increasing immigration to this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we apply in selection of immigrants. The basic change it makes is the elimination of the national origins quota system, in line with the recommendations of the last four Presidents of the United States, and Members of Congress from both parties.

For 41 years, the immigration policy of our country has been crippled by this system. Because of it we have never been able to achieve the annual quota use authorized by law. We have discriminated in favor of some people over others, contrary to our basic principles as a nation, simply on the basis of birth. We have separated families needlessly. We have been forced to forego the talents of many professionals whose skills were needed to cure, to teach and to enhance the lives of Americans.

The present law has caused thousands of instances of personal hardship, of which every Senator is aware. Several times Congress has tried to correct the twisted results of the national origins system through emergency legislation. Six times between 1948 and 1962 laws were passed for the admission of refugees. Four times between 1957 and 1962 we have made special provisions for relatives of American citizens or orphans. In addition, each year we are called upon to consider thousands of private bills to accommodate persons caught in the backwash of this origins system.

These efforts at circumvention are further proof that the national origins system is in disrepute. We cannot continue to respect a law we constantly seek to circumvent. To continue with such a law brings discredit upon ourselves as legislators. The national origins system has even failed in the purpose for which it was intended: to keep the ethnic balance of our country forever as it was in 1920. In 1920, 79 percent of our white population was of northern and western European origin. During the first 30 years of the national origins system, only 39 percent of our total immigration came from such areas. Since 1952, some 3.5 million persons have been admitted to this country as immigrants. Two-thirds of them came outside the national origins quota. Since 1952, we have authorized 2.1 million national origins quota numbers. Only one-half of these numbers were used.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statistical summary of immigrants admitted from June 30, 1953, through June 30, 1964.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Immigrants admitted to the United States, by classes under the immigration laws, years ended June 30, 1953-64

Class	1953-64	1953 ¹	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Total immigrants admitted	3,107,817	170,434	208,177	237,790	321,625	326,867	253,265	260,686	265,308	271,344	283,763	306,260	292,248
Quota immigrants (total)	1,140,479	84,175	94,008	82,232	89,310	97,178	102,153	97,657	101,373	96,104	90,310	103,036	102,844
Immigration and Nationality Act	1,124,818	78,053	88,016	79,617	88,825	97,084	102,077	97,651	101,352	96,074	90,305	102,995	102,814
1st preference quota:													
Selected immigrants of special skill or ability	30,610	77	1,429	1,776	1,946	2,992	3,941	3,518	3,385	3,460	3,313	2,288	2,475
Their spouses and children	28,676	45	1,027	1,236	1,420	2,739	3,197	3,109	3,681	3,758	3,721	2,374	2,387
Skilled agriculturists, their wives and children (1924 act)	311	321											
Parents or husbands of U.S. citizens (1924 act)	4,230	4,290											
2d preference quota:	35,827	933	2,783	2,394	2,843	3,677	2,608	3,406	3,451	3,381	2,252	4,006	4,063
Parents of U.S. citizens	2,400												
Unmarried sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ²	4,133	4,133											
Wives and children of resident aliens (1924 act)													
3d preference quota:	28,480	261	8,180	2,604	2,902	2,848	2,719	3,409	2,767	2,182	1,786	1,832	1,980
Spouses of resident aliens	36,118	220	2,824	2,821	4,064	3,783	2,668	4,134	3,225	3,265	2,419	3,286	3,929
4th preference quota:	22,406	63	1,556	1,955	1,690	1,715	2,903	2,162	1,956	2,346	2,162	2,187	1,711
Brothers or sisters of U.S. citizens	7,128	22	374	1,120	431	1,443	2,029	1,275	425	244	205	199	161
Married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ³													
Spouses and children of brothers or sisters, sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ⁴	11,780												
Adopted sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ⁵	87												
Nonpreference quota:	911,468	67,608	74,843	65,711	73,529	77,887	82,080	76,688	80,987	73,923	71,542	83,563	83,207
Special legislation (quota immigrants)	15,446	6,122	6,082	2,615	485	94	76	6	21	30	14	41	30
Displaced persons (Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (quotas))	15,21	5,759	6,082	2,615	485	94	76	6			3	1	
Skilled sheepherders (act of Apr. 9, 1952 (quotas))	363												
Foreign government officials adjusted under sec. 13, (act of Sept. 11, 1957 (quotas))	32												
Nonquota immigrants (total)	2,057,378	86,259	114,079	155,558	232,315	229,689	151,112	163,029	164,025	175,240	193,444	203,224	189,404
Immigration and Nationality Act	1,681,355	85,015	112,854	126,135	155,808	147,243	125,591	111,341	133,087	152,383	169,346	183,283	178,200
Wives of U.S. citizens	236,380	15,916	17,145	18,504	21,244	21,794	23,517	22,620	21,621	20,012	17,316	17,590	19,701
Husbands of U.S. citizens	73,418	3,359	7,725	6,716	5,788	5,767	5,833	6,913	6,140	6,059	6,646	6,035	6,437
Children of U.S. citizens	70,396	3,268	5,819	5,662	4,710	4,798	5,970	6,869	6,454	6,480	6,364	6,981	7,531
Natives of Western Hemisphere countries	1,227,778	58,985	78,897	92,026	122,083	111,344	86,523	66,386	89,566	110,140	130,741	144,677	135,816
Their spouses and children	27,482	2,114	1,629	1,654	1,949	2,144	2,052	1,810	2,135	2,696	2,764	3,067	3,468
Persons who had been U.S. citizens	302	104	427	87	44	58	43	22	36	15	25	23	18
Ministers of religious denominations, their spouses and children	5,107	387	385	307	350	403	435	558	485	406	451	462	478
Employees of U.S. Government abroad, their spouses and children	205	2	4	9	2	8	23	24	27	10	3	32	61
Children born abroad to resident aliens or subsequent to issuance of visa	12,117	326	358	348	412	701	926	1,228	1,458	1,411	1,495	1,611	1,843
Aliens adjusted under sec. 249, Immigration and Nationality Act ⁶	22,795	8,605	8,554	465	228	226	226	260	4,321	4,773	5,037	3,399	2,680
Other nonquota immigrants	376,003	1,244	1,225	29,423	75,507	82,446	25,521	51,688	30,938	22,858	24,098	19,941	11,204
Special legislation (nonquota immigrants)	1,030	1,030											
Displaced persons (Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (nonquotas))	466	399	67										
Orphans (act of July 29, 1953)	189,021		821	29,002	75,473	82,444	1,012	198	43	9	15	3	1
Refugees (Refugee Relief Act of 1953)													
Skilled sheepherders (act of Sept. 3, 1964 (non- quotas))	885			354	31		24,467	24,834	6,612	3,982	1,809	213	31
Immigrants (act of Sept. 11, 1957)	61,948							25,424	5,067	122	51	20	17
Hungarian parolees (act of July 25, 1958)	30,701												
Azores and Netherlands refugees (act of Sept. 2, 1958)	22,218							1,187	8,870	5,472	4,706	1,888	
Immigrants (secs. 4 and 6, act of Sept. 22, 1959)	29,837							10,314	13,265	5,488	280		
Immigrants (act of Sept. 26, 1961)	15,525										11,612	2,848	765
Other nonquota immigrants (special legislation)	412	214	5		8	2	42	45	32	18	27	12	12
Refugee and escapees (act of July 14, 1960)	6,111										2,005	4,106	6,272
Immigrants (act of Oct. 24, 1962)	18,944												

¹ In 1953 figures include admissions under Immigration Act of 1/24.² Prior to act of Sept. 22, 1959, all sons or daughters of U.S. citizens over 21 years of age were classified as 4th preference quota under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Adopted sons and daughters with petitions approved prior to Sept. 22, 1959, remained 4th preference.

³ Prior to act of Sept. 22, 1959, included only children under 21 of resident aliens. Adult sons or daughters of resident aliens were classified as nonpreference quota.⁴ Prior to act of Sept. 22, 1959, classified as nonpreference quota.⁵ Not reported prior to 1959.⁶ Includes 321 professors of colleges and universities their wives and children.

the national origins system must be eliminated.

The current bill phases out the national origins system over a 3-year period. Beginning July 1, 1968, our immigration policy will be based on the concept of "first come, first served." We no longer will ask a man where he was born. Instead we will ask if he seeks to join his family or if he can help meet the economic and social needs of the Nation. Favoritism based on nationality will disappear. Favoritism based on individual worth and qualifications will take its place.

When this system is fully in effect, 170,300 quota numbers will be available to the world, exclusive of the Western Hemisphere. Parents, spouses, and children of U.S. citizens will be considered as

"immediate relatives" and, as such, will be under no numerical limitation at all. Due to the existence of backlogs of applicants in those nations discriminated against by the national origins system, an annual limitation per country of 20,000 quota immigrants is established, so that in the short run no one nation will be able to receive an unduly disproportionate share of the quota numbers. It is anticipated that after 3 years, these backlogs of intending immigrants will be eliminated in all instances but for one category of Italians, and that situation will be rectified shortly thereafter.

The total number of authorized quotas is not increased substantially by this bill. Currently, we authorize the use of 158,561 numbers per year, but this is exclusive of refugees. Under the new

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The present bill contemplates, under the Western Hemisphere rule, only those countries which are independent and thus continues the hardship on the small island areas which can never become independent because of their accident of location, size and lack of natural resources. Yet, from 1921 to 1924, these adjacent islands enjoyed the same benefits as the rest of the Western Hemisphere. These islands will be grouped now ultimately into the world quota and, as a consequence, face a potential of no possibility of immigration to the United States.

It does seem incongruous that less than one-half of 1 percent of the total Western Hemisphere population should be excluded from consideration with the other 99½ percent.

I do not propose to offer my amendment from the floor at this time. Nothing should impede the progress of this legislation. I intend, however, to introduce legislation in the next session to allow people from the adjacent islands to immigrate as do all others from the Western Hemisphere nations. We should not permit such petty inequities to continue. I hope others will join me in this effort.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. Is the rule of germaneness still in effect?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time under the rule of germaneness expired 9 minutes ago.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I rise in defense of the position taken with respect to the actions of the United States in the Dominican Republic by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT].

To my deep regret, this puts me in opposition to my good friends the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD].

I had occasion to call to the attention of Senators earlier this week a most interesting article which appeared in the Sunday magazine section of the New York Times, written by the able and veteran reporter, Tom Wicker, the principal Capitol Hill reporter for the New York Times, entitled "Winds of Change in the Senate."

In his article Mr. Wicker commented, and I think with reason, that the art of debate appears to have been more or less lost in this body to which I am so proud to belong.

Possibly even by speaking to a completely empty Chamber on a Friday afternoon—which I regret to state is

usually the case when I rise to address the Senate—I hope I can do a little to revive the tradition of debate which down through the years has made our legislative body an institution of which I hope the American people are still proud.

Before addressing myself to the substance of the disagreement between the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and the three other Senators whom I have mentioned, I should like to make four preliminary remarks.

First, nobody—I repeat nobody—least of all the Senator from Arkansas—has attacked the President of the United States for what he did in the Dominican crisis. The position of the Senator from Arkansas, with which I agree, is that the President got bad advice—very bad advice. But having received that advice from individuals in his administration whom he had good reason to trust, particularly advice with respect to facts which turned out to be wrong, the President had no alternative except to do pretty much what he did. Therefore, I would make it clear that neither the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] nor I, despite what the three Senators have said to the contrary, have said one single word in criticism of the President.

My second point is that what may or may not have happened when the President called certain legislative leaders to the White House to discuss the crisis in the Dominican Republic, after he had decided to send the Marines in, but before they had actually gone, is entirely irrelevant to the points raised by the Senator from Arkansas. The Senator from Arkansas has no responsibility whatever for the decision made at the White House. He was in no position at that point to disagree with what the President recommended, because his sources of information were no different from those of the President. I believe it grossly unfair for the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] and the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] to criticize the Senator from Arkansas for having remained silent at the White House after the President announced he was going to send in the troops.

In fact, the Senator from Arkansas said in his speech that he agrees that it was probably necessary to send a small force of Marines into Santo Domingo to protect American lives, particularly in view of the intelligence information, much of it inaccurate, which had come to the White House at that time. I agree with that, too. I believe we were under an obligation, despite our treaty obligations to the contrary, to send in a small force to protect American lives.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that no American lives were lost. Despite the gross exaggeration with respect to the alleged danger under which Americans and other foreigners found themselves in Santo Domingo in those critical days toward the end of April, not one single American life was lost.

So I reiterate that, in my opinion, the Senator from Arkansas is subject to no just criticism because he did not object when the President, at the White House, announced that he had decided to send in the Marines. This argument is espe-

cially irrelevant to any issue raised by the Senator from Arkansas in his carefully thought-through and closely reasoned speech. I hope we shall hear no more in criticism of the Senator from Arkansas for what he did or did not do at the White House conference.

My third preliminary comment is that the Senator from Arkansas based his speech on 6 weeks of testimony in executive session before the Committee on Foreign Relations, at which practically every witness from the administration who participated in the Dominican crisis, with three exceptions, was heard and examined at some length by members of the committee. The speech was based also on newspaper articles, weekly news magazine articles, and other information from reputable American journalists, information which was available to the Committee on Foreign Relations as well as to the three Senators I have mentioned.

I sat through those hearings. I either heard the testimony—and I usually did hear the testimony and the cross-examination—of each of the witnesses, or, if I could not be present, I went to the committee room later and read the testimony, including the cross-examination. I can testify from my own personal knowledge that the comments of the Senator from Arkansas are fully and accurately documented by the classified record in the files of the Committee on Foreign Relations. If any Senator doubts what I say, I urge him or her to read that record.

I do not know whether the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], or the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] have read that record. Perhaps they will tell us in due course. However, I do know that, with the possible exception of a total of approximately one-half hour, when one of those Senators may have been present at one of those hearings, they did not show up at all. Therefore, their criticism of what the Senator from Arkansas has said is not based on any knowledge of that record in the Committee on Foreign Relations.

This is not necessarily a cause for serious criticism. No doubt the Senators have other sources of information than those which were available to me and to the Senator from Arkansas and to the members of the committee. They are certainly entitled to come in on the floor of the Senate and say whatever they think about it.

The point I want to make is that every single statement of the Senator from Arkansas is carefully documented in the official record of the hearings over which he presided. I raise several questions as to whether these other three Senators can document what they have said.

The fourth preliminary point that I should like to make is that the real issue with respect to the Dominican Republic is not: "Did we do the right thing or did we not do the right thing? Did we, as the Senator from Arkansas says, react too slowly in the first place and then overreact in the second place? Were our activities on the whole in the best

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interests of the United States of America or not?" These are not the issues.

The real issue is, Where do we go from here? What have we done, if anything, by this action to downgrade the influence of the United States of America through all of Latin America? And what can we do to remedy the harm?

If, as I firmly believe, we have lost many friends and made some enemies, what can we do to remedy that situation so that we can get back to the foreign policy to which John Fitzgerald Kennedy so ably led us when he advocated and pressed through Congress the Alliance for Progress bill, when he revived the good neighbor policy of his predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when he offered the hand of friendship to those democratic nations of Latin America which believe that through social, economic, and political democracy Latin America can arise and defeat communism.

I ask the question whether we help defeat communism by standing up for a landed oligarchy governed by military junta groups which have come to be known in Latin America not as guerrillas, but as gorillas, by defying and suppressing efforts for land reform, for housing reform, for education, for health, for feeding the poor, by keeping in office economically as well as politically discredited oligarchies, or do we do better in the interest of the United States in supporting men like Betancourt, and Leoni in Venezuela, and Belaunde in Peru, and the successors of Jose Figueres in Costa Rica, and Frei Montalva and other splendid Latin Americans who are pressing to carry into effect the principles of the Alliance for Progress? Or do we do better if we put our blue chips on the military who come back, having learned the American way of life at the Command and General Staff School in Leavenworth?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Louisiana that I am most happy that he is on the floor.

I have a prepared address that I should like to deliver. Nevertheless, I should be very glad to yield to my friend from Louisiana, and I am sure that with that self-restraint for which he is so well known, he will ask a few questions and I shall do what I can to reply, and then I shall be permitted to continue.

I now yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I regret that I could not be here when the Senator commenced his address. I was attending a hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations which dealt with the problem of wheat shipments to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. CLARK. I was present this morning at the same hearing and made my position clear. I hope that, in that event at least, the Senator from Louisiana and I will find ourselves on the same side.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I hope that we can discuss it. Perhaps we can agree.

As the Senator indicated, I did not have the opportunity to sit through the

hearings to which he has referred. I have consulted with people who were either there and have read the record. I am not completely in the dark about what occurred in those hearings.

The Senator knows that I am the ranking member on the Committee on Finance. During that period I was attending hearings of the Finance Committee and also representing the Senate in conference with the House on a number of major bills and conference reports, some of which are now at the desk.

I would like to have been present at the hearings, but I was not able to be there. During that same period of time I was attending meetings at the White House, as the assistant majority leader, and did have available to me the same information which was available to the President.

My judgment of this situation is simply this: That what started in this area as a revolution by people who were not Communists, but who were seeking to overthrow what could perhaps be described as a rightwing government.

Mr. CLARK. Is the Senator referring to the Reid Cabral government?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I was referring to the so-called military junta.

Mr. CLARK. To the junta which succeeded the military government.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator is correct. The three Communist Parties in that country moved in on this situation, as Communists always seek to do when chaos exists. They had gained a great deal of power and were on their way toward achieving control of this revolution.

The military junta group requested our Government to go in. Our Government inquired, "Are you requesting us to go in because you can no longer protect the Americans who are there?"

As I understand it, even the Senator from Arkansas does not dispute that the answer to that question was yes, and that it was proper that the United States send troops.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, from the attention that I was able to give to the problem, I understood that the Reid Cabral government had fallen for reasons which we do not need to go into. The government under Moreno Urrillo, who was the legitimate successor of Bosch, thinking that it was defeated, had taken refuge in other Latin American and foreign embassies. At the instance of the CIA—I believe it can be documented—a new junta headed by a certain Colonel Benoit had been formed, although it was pretty well confined to the San Isidro air base. That junta sent word to Ambassador Bennett, "You had better send American troops in because a Communist takeover threatens."

Ambassador Bennett sent word back, "I can't get away with bringing Americans in on that ground because the evidence is not clear. If you will change your request and make it in writing, and ask American forces to intervene in order to protect American lives, then I believe that we can persuade Washington to do it."

So Benoit changed his position and put

it on the basis of protecting American lives. Bennett forwarded that post haste to the State Department and to the White House, and troops were sent in.

The President announced that he was doing it to protect American lives. However, Bennett also sent to Washington the original statement of Colonel Benoit, and, the day the troops landed, a totally unauthorized statement was made by one of the chief naval officers of the U.S. Navy in Santo Domingo that we were going in to crush the Communists.

It is all very well to talk about protecting American lives, but the real reason that the marines went in there was to prevent a Communist takeover.

At that point Admiral Rayburn, who had been sworn in as the new head of the CIA perhaps 24 hours before that—and a fine man he is; no doubt he had to rely entirely on the information which was coming to him from Santo Domingo—was able to produce the names of only three Communists who were said to be connected with the revolutionary movement. This was obviously not enough to impress the American people. Seventy-two hours later, they produced the names of 58 Communists, and thus made a somewhat better showing.

I do not have a shadow of a doubt that after we did what we did, by sending in around 20,000 troops, the three tiny Communist parties in the Dominican Republic, one of them Castro dominated, one of them Moscow dominated, one of them China dominated, were able to take such advantage of the confusion and lack of order in downtown Santo Domingo. The fact is that a lot of the Bosch people became scared and ran away to embassies because they thought they were defeated. I have no doubt that thereafter, the rebel movement was very strongly influenced by the Communists. But it was not in the beginning, and actually the Communists never deposed Caamaño Deno, the constitutional leader who is not a Communist.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. My understanding of the matter was that the Communists had gained a great amount of control, and were in command in a substantial number of positions, many of them key positions in the revolution.

Based on what little we know, when we look at a situation of that sort, the revolution had more the earmarks of a Communist takeover than had Castro's, when Castro was taking over Cuba.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator made that argument very eloquently the other day on the floor. All I can say is, my sources of information are possibly different than his. I know this is the information put forth by the administration, and particularly by Mr. Thomas Mann, who was the architect of our policy. I merely disagree with it.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. It is a matter of judgment. Perhaps the Senator would agree with me, that when the President of the United States becomes convinced, first, that American lives are in danger, he has a duty to protect those American lives; and, second, when he becomes convinced that failure to act means he is risking a Communist takeover of another nation in this hemi-

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sphere, in my judgment, if he fails to act, he is failing to discharge his responsibility to the American people.

In my judgment, had President Eisenhower known that the Castro takeover in Cuba was going to work out the way it did, things might have been different.

There were in the Castro movement a number of Communists who claimed they were not Communists—Castro claimed he was not a Communist. He lied to us. That is part of the Communist technique.

As a matter of fact, under Communist doctrine, as I am sure the Senator knows, truth from the Communist viewpoint is that which advances the spread of communism. So, if I say this man taking these notes is a man, if that does not promote the spread of communism, from the Communist point of view I have told a lie; according to Communist teaching, I should have said, "That's a woman."

Castro used those techniques on us. We did not know who all the Communists were in the Dominican Republic, but we knew many of them. Some were Castro-trained. As the Senator pointed out, some of them were the Peiping-type Communists, who would blast us off the face of the earth tomorrow if they had enough atom bombs, and some were the Russian type, experts in subversion. But they had enough help that they were in the process of taking over the revolution. That was the information available to the President; and if the Senator will check, he will find out that is what was happening.

If what the Dominican people want is a progressive reform government, a government with liberal ideas, such as the Senator has and as I myself have, then the people will have the opportunity to elect that sort of government and, in my judgment, they will be able to thank the United States of America that they have that opportunity, because if those Communists had taken over they would never have had it.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator made this same argument very eloquently on the floor of the Senate just a few days ago. I respect his integrity and his conviction. I said, perhaps before the Senator came in, that I thought he and the Senator from Florida were quite unfair to the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] by trying to throw the blame on him for not objecting to sending in the troops when he was summoned to the White House with some of the other leaders in the last days of April.

I pointed out then, and I point out again, that nobody is attacking the President of the United States—neither the Senator from Arkansas nor I. He said and I say that if we had had to make our decision on the basis of the information that came to him at the time he determined to send the troops in, we would have sent troops in, too. I do not think we would have sent so many, but we certainly would have sent in some.

I think the Senator from Florida and the Senator from Louisiana really do a disservice and an injustice to the Senator from Arkansas by trying to say that he or I or anybody else is attacking the

President of the United States, or that he or I or anybody else should have spoken up before the troops went in.

That is not the issue. The issue is: Was the advice that came to the President of the United States accurate? I say it was not. Were the recommendations that came to him from his subordinates sound? I say they were not.

But with the information he had, he had no other choice.

With respect to the position of the Senator from Louisiana about Castro's Cuba, it seems to me that is largely irrelevant and, in the end, the difference of opinion between the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Louisiana is just this simple: Whose judgment is right?

I firmly believe that had we not done what we did in the Dominican Republic in the last days of April, the posture of the United States throughout Latin America would be far higher today than it is. Santo Domingo would have had the kind of government we wanted months before it did, and the whole posture of our relationship with the world in general, but with Latin America in particular, would have been better.

I point out to the Senator from Louisiana, as he knows, that I am a staunch supporter of the Johnson administration, as is the Senator from Louisiana. Every now and then, we stray off the reservation a little bit, but most of the time, we are supporting the President and his program, and the Great Society.

But if the balance of powers and the separation of powers means anything, then the Senator from Louisiana and I have not only the right but the duty to speak our minds when we disagree with the policy laid down by the Chief Executive; and with deep regret, that is what I am doing now. I say to my friend from Louisiana, I shall be back on the team on Monday when the immigration bill comes up. I hope he will be there, too, with me.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. May I say to the Senator that it seems to me that fundamentally, his case is to establish that the Communists had no substantial influence, and were not achieving increased influence, in that revolutionary group. If he cannot establish that; if the contrary was true, and the Communists were achieving more and more power in that revolt, it seems to me the Senator has not established his case, but rather the case which supports the President and his advisers.

Mr. CLARK. Let me say, with all the deep affection I feel for my friend from Louisiana, that I do not think I have to make any case. The case has been made by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. All I am doing now is to rebut the efforts of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] in their attack on the case made by the Senator from Arkansas.

I stand foursquare on the speech made by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Senator from Louisiana has ably attempted to oppose that

case. But I am not here making any case at all. I stand foursquare on what I consider the brilliant, able, and constructive speech made by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Did the Senator from Pennsylvania hear the speech of the Senator from Ohio on the floor today?

Mr. CLARK. Which Senator from Ohio?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE].

Mr. CLARK. No; but out of the deep affection and high regard that I have for my close friend the senior Senator from Ohio, I shall certainly be happy to read his speech. I am sorry I did not hear it. I certainly would not wish to prejudge the position taken by my good friend from Ohio, but I can say, generally speaking, that in matters of this sort the senior Senator from Ohio and I rarely find ourselves in agreement.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator aware of the speech made by the majority leader today in support of the President's action? It seems to me that the Senator ought to be aware of the fact that he is answering more than three Senators.

Mr. CLARK. If it is necessary to answer five, I shall be glad to take on five. As the colloquy thus far indicates, I am having great difficulty taking on one Senator, my good friend from Louisiana.

Now, Mr. President, I return to the major part of my speech. I suggest that the three Senators I have mentioned have not only failed to refute the seven specific conclusions reached by the Senator from Arkansas, but for the most part have refused to meet him head on and have tended to go off on irrelevant side channels having nothing whatever to do with the major impact of the speech of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT].

Let me give an example. The Senators from Louisiana and Florida have both argued that there was need for hasty action in that fatal last week of April of this year, and that there was no time to evaluate the situation judiciously. Then they make the basic and I believe false assumption that the only rapid form of action which could be taken was that which was taken; namely, massive military intervention on the side of the militarists who had kicked out the only legitimate, democratically elected government the Dominican Republic had had in the course of 38 years.

Actually, the Senator from Arkansas criticized the administration for timidity as well as for overreaction. He pointed out that we should have moved long before we did to support the legitimate government of the Dominican Republic, represented in the first stages of the revolution by the acting president, Molina Urena.

The Senator from Arkansas pointed out that there were two opportunities, first, on April 25, when the PRD, which was the Bosch party, and the only really democratic party of the moderate left in the Dominican Republic, requested a

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U.S. presence, by which they meant our Government's support for return to constitutional government under Bosch; and, second, 2 days later, on April 27, when the constitutionalists—sometimes erroneously called the rebels—thinking themselves defeated, appealed to Ambassador Bennett for mediation, a request which he refused on the ground that it would have constituted intervention.

Thus, the Senator from Arkansas called not for inaction, but for even more rapid action, which was eventually taken—and on the wrong side.

The issue is not whether it should have been action, but what kind of action. The administration ended intervening in a massive way with military forces on April 28. The Senator from Arkansas would have had us intervene politically either 1 or 3 days earlier.

The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Long] contends, on page 23007 of the Record, and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] suggested, on page 5 of a judiciary subcommittee document entitled "Organization of American States Combined Reports on Communist Subversion," that the OAS mediation team sent to Santo Domingo, by the 10th meeting of consultation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics wholly and completely justified the unilateral intervention of the United States in Santo Domingo. But, a reading of the report establishes, clearly indeed, that this is not the fact. The report describes the situation as one of chaos in security replete with human suffering. It supports the efforts of members of the OAS committee to bring about a cease-fire. It contains a proposal for the dispatching of an inter-American force which, in fact, had already been decided upon, but it contains no statement whatever endorsing the unilateral action of the United States, although the two Senators I have mentioned state categorically that the committee's report did exactly that.

Critics of the Senator from Arkansas contend that there was clear danger to American lives in Santo Domingo, and that this was the prime reason for the intervention of the United States. I have dealt with that comment earlier in this talk. I can only say now that I agree with the Senator from Arkansas that there was danger to Americans, although no American was, in fact, killed or wounded until after the marines went in and started exchanging fire with the constitutional forces.

I say that on the basis of Monday morning quarterbacking—and I agree that what I am doing, what the Senator from Arkansas did, and to some extent what the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], the Senator from Florida [Mr. Smathers], and the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Long] have been doing is Monday morning quarterbacking—on the basis of a calm and judicious review of what happened, there is very little doubt that the principal motive for American intervention was to save military and dictatorial forces in the Dominican Republic from a military defeat.

Ambassador Bennett requested walkie-talkies for the military junta, and he got them. When Colonel Benoit, then head of the military junta, asked for American intervention, he got it. He got it on a ground which, to put it mildly, was not a candid statement of the facts.

In any case, it is a documented fact that Ambassador Bennett, on April 27, when the militarists were winning, refused to intervene to support the constitutional government which was the successor of the only democratically elected government the Dominican Republic had had for over a generation.

Then, the next day, when it looked as though the Constitutionalists were going to win, Ambassador Bennett pleaded desperately and successfully for intervention on the side of the militarists.

The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] states in the Record, on page 23295, and not for the first time, that the Senator from Arkansas' criticism of the recommendations of the President's advisers is organically related to a document entitled "Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic," which was prepared by the staff Committee on Foreign Relations, with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Service.

The Senator suggests that this documentation and supporting chronology have been heavily slanted against the administration by the careful process of editorial selection.

I hold in my hand the document in question. It starts out with what I believe all will admit to be a definitely nonpartisan statement, that on December 5, 1492, Columbus discovered America. It happened to be the island of Hispaniola, and of course he stopped off on his way at the little island in the Bahamas, San Salvador.

But I submit to any objective observer who wants to test the validity of the charge of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] that the rest of the chronology is just as objective and unslanted as the original statement which I have just read—and it is composed largely of official administration statements which may have turned out to be damaging to the administration's case, but certainly were not consciously intended to achieve that result—actually this chronology was not drawn, as the Senator from Connecticut contends, from anti-administration press sources, but, rather, primarily from a noncontroversial source entitled "Deadline Data on World Affairs," and from major metropolitan newspapers, including the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Washington Post, the Times of London, Der Welt of Hamburg, the London Economist, the London Observer, Le Monde of Paris.

I submit, and I would hope the Senator from Connecticut would agree, that these are reputable metropolitan journals, which, by and large, tend to support the administration. If they were critical of U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic, this might suggest that there is something wrong with that policy rather than that the committee and its staff, and the

editorial and reportorial writers who prepared this documentation, were biased.

Actually, as the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright] pointed out, the only nonadministration witness whom the Committee on Foreign Relations heard was the former Governor of Puerto Rico, Munoz Marin, a strong supporter of the administration. I felt the committee should have heard witnesses in opposition to the administration's policy. The chairman, and I suspect a majority of our colleagues on that committee, felt that if we had opened the hearing up to press reporters who had been on the scene, we would have gotten into a Donnybrook which would have been difficult to bring to a conclusion, and the decision was made not to call the other witnesses.

I said earlier that I think there were three witnesses who should have been called. One was John Bartlow Martin, who wrote what I believe to be a highly inaccurate story of what he found in the Dominican Republic. He was down there as a representative of the administration, and upon his return, he wrote this rather extraordinary article in one of the leading outlets of the Luce publications.

I think it is a little unusual, from the protocol point of view, for a former Foreign Service officer—in fact, the former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic—to go down to the Dominican Republic, spend a week, fail in his efforts to bring peace, and then come back and write his side of the story for Life magazine.

It is not for me to criticize. I think he should have been called as a witness, and we should have had an opportunity to question him with respect to his participation in the crisis.

The second witness who I think should have been called was McGeorge Bundy, who went to the Dominican Republic at the request of the President, and spent 10 days down there, trying, unsuccessfully, to bring the crisis to an end. Mr. Bundy, in what I consider to be a disregard of the relevant precedents took refuge in executive privilege and refused to appear before the committee. At one point he said he would come and have tea with us, but then he refused even to do that.

The third witness, whom I hope we still may call when the time is right, is that wise, experienced, extraordinarily able veteran of the Foreign Service, who appears as of now, to have brought the crisis to a successful conclusion, with a display of diplomacy which evokes my admiration and I am sure that of every other member of the committee, regardless of their point of view with respect to this particular crisis, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

I hope, when the smoke settles a little and the present temporary government of President Garcia Godoy is a little more firmly on its feet, Ambassador Bunker will come and tell the Foreign Relations Committee about the situation he found when he went down there, and how he was able to bring about this near miracle, an instance of pulling a rabbit out of a

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hat, worthy, in my opinion, of the late Houdini.

The background information prepared by the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Legislative Reference Service contains excerpts from the Rio de Janeiro Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States. A reading of articles 15, 17, and 19, of the OAS Charter and of article 6 of the Rio Treaty make it clear beyond peradventure of doubt that the United States of America's unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic was illegal and unauthorized; and since these provisions of the inter-American agreements suggest unfavorable inferences about the administration's policy, perhaps the Senator from Connecticut is correct in regarding their inclusion in this document to which he objects as a reflection of prejudice upon the part of the committee and its staff.

I point out that all this week there has been meeting in the city of Washington an extraordinary group called the International Conference on World Peace Through World Law. Legal and judicial delegates from more than 110 nations attended. The President of the United States went before them yesterday morning and made an extraordinary able and moving address before that body, in which he placed the United States of America squarely on record as supporting the rule of law as against the rule of force. I was happy, indeed, to see the President of the United States take that position, and I hope from here on in the United States of America will practice what it preaches, and not talk about the rule of law out of one side of its mouth and violate it out of the other side.

Mr. President, I do not wish to be misunderstood, because I say again, as the Senator from Arkansas said before, that I believe the initial intervention, had it been solely for the purpose of protecting American lives, was justified on humanitarian grounds. My position is that when that initial intervention was multiplied by many thousands of troops, and when the ostensible objective to protect American lives was converted by advisers of the administration into an effort to intervene in a civil war to prevent an alleged Communist takeover, its illegality became obvious and apparent.

I suggest that the Senator from Connecticut, an extremely useful Member of this body and a good friend of mine, will, on second thought, want to withdraw the suggestion which he made at pages 23297 and 23298 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that the Senator from Arkansas is soft on communism.

I suggest that the freedom of both public and private men to speak out in candor, either for or against official policy, is an integral part of the American form of liberty, and also an integral part of our constitutional form of government, which requires that the Senate of the United States, as a part of the legislative branch, advise and consent to the activities of the executive.

Mr. President, in this connection I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks an edi-

torial which appeared on September 17, in the Washington Post entitled "Panic Button."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 17, 1965]

PANIC BUTTON

Senator DODD's reply to Senator FULBRIGHT's critique of the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic is essentially to try to depict Mr. FULBRIGHT as soft on communism. This tawdry if familiar tactic does Mr. DODD no credit. There is legitimate ground for disagreement with Mr. FULBRIGHT's analysis, which had the benefit of 4 months of hindsight, without attempting to smear his motives.

That there were, and are, Communists in the Dominican Republic no one disputes; here Mr. DODD is tilting at the wrong windmill. What is disputed is whether they were in a position to capture the revolution that the United States in effect halted when representatives of the American Embassy induced the administration to push the panic button. Some influential anti-Communist Dominicans think they were not.

Nowhere does Mr. DODD deal with several basic questions raised by Mr. FULBRIGHT: Did the United States fully use the resources available to it without sending in the marines—and was the administration candid with the public? Obviously the United States must be alert to Castroite maneuvers, including efforts to take over and direct local grievances. But if we allow American policy to be dominated and even paralyzed by fear of another Cuba, we shall soon find ourselves sending marines around the hemisphere losing friends and alienating people.

Mr. DODD contends, and some in the administration agree with him, that Mr. FULBRIGHT's speech damaged the country because the criticism will be picked up abroad. On the contrary the intervention, whether or not it was necessary, is what started the process. One of the strengths of America in the eyes of other peoples—and a point that can belie Mr. FULBRIGHT's complaints that the United States appears unsympathetic to demands for social justice abroad (by contrast with the social revolution taking place at home)—is that we can debate issues publicly and seek to learn from experience. But to argue that all's well that ends well in the Dominican Republic is like insisting that because a broken leg ultimately heals it somehow is good for you.

Mr. CLARK. The editorial concludes that those who "argue that all is well that ends well in the Dominican Republic, is like insisting that because a broken leg ultimately heals it somehow is good for you."

I suggest that the criticism of our Dominican policy made by the Senator from Arkansas was healthy, salutary, and in the long run will be helpful to the administration and to the future conduct of our foreign policy in Latin America.

Senator FULBRIGHT needs no defense from me against the charge that he is soft on communism. I suspect that every one of the other 99 Senators in this body, including the Senator from Connecticut, on second thought, would stand up and defy anybody who, outside these halls, said that he was.

There is no more loyal, intelligent, and able American in our country than the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I say again that I am sure, on further reflection, that the Senator from Connecticut will wish to withdraw the implication contained in the quotation from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD which I have just made.

I further suggest that, as I said earlier, the current debate reflects great credit on the spirit of liberty and the spirit of freedom of speech in the Senate and the country at large.

In fact, the criticism of Senator FULBRIGHT is already beginning to have a positive effect in Latin America. Conversations with Latin Americans in Washington, especially the younger ones who were not tied to either the militarists or economic oligarchs, suggest that by bringing this matter into the open, as the Senator from Arkansas has done, he repairs the bitter disillusionment with the United States some of our best friends south of the border now feel. It is reviving some feeling of hope that the United States is still the friend of Latin American democracy.

This position is well developed by Senator FULBRIGHT on pages 23004 and 23005 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I suggest that the further point may now be stressed: that strong self-criticism of our country, of the administration, of its foreign policy, both in the Senate and elsewhere, is essential to clearing the air and restoring an honest and friendlier relationship between the United States and the democratic nationalist reformers who are our best friends in Latin America.

Acknowledgement of error, mistaken action, and lack of candor is not only essential to dispel lingering disillusionment, but it is also a convincing demonstration of good faith on the part of the people of the United States toward those able and dedicated Latin Americans who are devoting their lives toward establishing in that important area of the world the same kind of democratic pluralistic society of which we are so proud in the United States of America.

I conclude to some extent as I started.

The questions are not so much what did we do in the months of April, May, June, July, and August in the Dominican Republic, but first what are the implications of what we did on the future of our Latin American policy?

And second, if we did make mistakes—and I think we did—what can we now do to remedy them?

I suggest that Under Secretary of State Mann and Assistant Secretary of State Jack Vaughn would be well advised, and I hope they will be, if they devote their best efforts from here on in patching up our damaged relationships with those men in Latin America and the countries they represent who are our real friends: the democratic, the liberal, and, if you will, the slightly left-of-center leaders, not the military juntas or the oligarchical landowners, who are cheering what we did in the Dominican Republic.

I suggest we look to Belamunde Terry, Lconi, Betancourt in Venezuela, Jose Figueras and his successors in Costa Rica.

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I suggest we look to President Frei, of Chile, at this moment the greatest of them all, who fought Communists to a standstill and obtained a free liberal democratic, New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, Great Society government in that magnificent and hard-pressed thin stretch of liberty in South America, a government which supports the same essential freedoms which we are so proud of here.

I suggest we look to Alberto Lleras in Colombia, and the men who support his policy there.

These are the true friends of America. These are the countries where the Alianza para el Progreso has the best chance of success. It is here that we should be looking to bolster American policy, to give these men and these countries our assistance, to hearten them, and congratulate them, because that is where the friends of the United States of America are located.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 39 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, September 20, 1965, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate September 17, 1965:

U.S. ATTORNEY

William H. Murdock, of North Carolina, to be U.S. attorney for the middle district of North Carolina for the term of 4 years. (Reappointment.)

William Medford, of North Carolina, to be U.S. attorney for the western district of North Carolina for the term of 4 years. (Reappointment.)

I nominate the following-named persons to be postmasters:

ALASKA

Herbert Apassingok, Sr., Gambell, Alaska, in place of John Apangalook, resigned.

ARIZONA

Homer L. Fancher, Bullhead City, Ariz., in place of B. E. Fox, retired.

CALIFORNIA

Dorothy M. Collis, Brentwood, Calif., in place of R. J. Wallace, retired.

Maynard Green, Covina, Calif., in place of C. G. McCarn, retired.

Theodore F. Locicero, Monterey, Calif., in place of L. S. Brown, retired.

Ellen C. Cothran, Westmorland, Calif., in place of F. F. Johnson, deceased.

COLORADO

Susan L. Thompson, Frisco, Colo., in place of R. S. Foote, retired.

James A. Guadnola, Grand Junction, Colo., in place of H. W. Cross, retired.

Robert W. Shewfelt, Parker, Colo., in place of Sophia Johnson, retired.

CONNECTICUT

Vincent P. Nolan, Southington, Conn., in place of E. C. Butler, deceased.

IDAHO

Daniel K. Wilson, Lapwai, Idaho, in place of C. F. Angel, retired.

ILLINOIS

Joseph A. Stal, Georgetown, Ill., in place of A. T. Humrichous, retired.

Marlin H. Ferguson, Hartford, Ill., in place of F. L. Reilly, deceased.

KENTUCKY

Franklin A. Ordorff, Adairville, Ky., in place of J. R. Trimble, retired.

MAINE

Chester W. Curtis, Richmond, Maine, in place of Don O. Cate, retired.

MASSACHUSETTS

Friedland C. Peltier, Oxford, Mass., in place of H. C. Taft, retired.

William F. Griffin, Rutland, Mass., in place of D. M. Lincoln, retired.

MICHIGAN

Leonard E. Amidon, Interlochen, Mich., in place of R. J. Buller, retired.

James R. Budak, Lakeside, Mich., in place of M. B. Perham, retired.

Calvin P. Leach, Le Roy, Mich., in place of H. B. Erickson, retired.

Mark C. Dilts, Mesick, Mich., in place of Ernest Belville, retired.

Lawrence A. Frith, Vermontville, Mich., in place of R. K. Kilpatrick, transferred.

MISSISSIPPI

William T. Hudspeth, Hickory Flat, Miss., in place of N. L. Hall, retired.

MISSOURI

John Rowlett, Jr., Maitland, Mo., in place of H. R. Cowan, retired.

NEBRASKA

Audrey A. Adams, Lyman, Nebr., in place of B. E. McKee, deceased.

Theodore R. Gaedke, Wellfleet, Nebr., in place of P. D. Coder, transferred.

NEW YORK

William B. Chavis, Long Eddy, N.Y., in place of S. F. Kenney, retired.

NORTH CAROLINA

William E. Twiford, Kill Devil Hills, N.C., in place of I. L. Twiford, retired.

NORTH DAKOTA

Edward A. Seel, Rugby, N. Dak., in place of H. D. Walland, retired.

OHIO

Henry C. Waggoner, Amsterdam, Ohio, in place of R. N. Croskey, resigned.

Carl J. Burkhart, Leavittsburg, Ohio, in place of C. M. Burkhart, retired.

Willard C. Geis, Massillon, Ohio, in place of J. E. Snee, retired.

William P. Moran, Roseville, Ohio, in place of M. D. Sowers, deceased.

OKLAHOMA

Charles M. McCurdy, Tupelo, Okla., in place of M. J. Finch, deceased.

PENNSYLVANIA

C. Jean Steinkirchner, Jennerstown, Pa., in place of E. K. Hay, retired.

SOUTH DAKOTA

LaVerne V. Johannessen, Erwin, S. Dak., in place of Catherine Kazmerzak, retired.

TENNESSEE

Robert M. Sams, Dandridge, Tenn., in place of R. S. Hill, deceased.

Harold A. Hutcheson, Soddy, Tenn., in place of J. H. Davenport, retired.

TEXAS

Edison Monroe, Eustace, Tex., in place of W. H. Wheeler, deceased.

Harold A. Doane, Jr., Haslet, Tex., in place of H. M. George, Jr., removed.

UTAH

Pete L. Bruno, Price, Utah, in place of William Grogan, retired.

Ernest R. Farnsworth, Santaquin, Utah, in place of R. J. Peterson, retired.

WASHINGTON

David L. Gray, Reardan, Wash., in place of L. A. Schultz, retired.

WEST VIRGINIA

William S. Penn, Jr., Bluefield, W. Va., in place of H. B. Faulkner, retired.

Charles H. Gillilan, Jr., Frankford, W. Va., in place of C. H. Gillilan, deceased.

WISCONSIN

Slas J. Paul, Montfort, Wis., in place of Harvey DeVall, retired.

Richard H. Vollmer, Mukwonago, Wis., in place of W. H. Ruppert, retired.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate September 17, 1965:

U.S. COAST GUARD

The following-named officers to be permanent commissioned officers in the Coast Guard in the grade indicated:

To be lieutenants

Charles F. Reid.

Warren H. Madson.

To be lieutenants (junior grade)

Vincent E. Abraham son Gary L. Rowe

Carl D. Bossard

John R. Malloy III Richard S. Bizar

Roy L. Foote

The nominations beginning John J. Solty, Jr., to be lieutenant (junior grade), and ending Ted B. Bryant to be lieutenant (junior grade), which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 31, 1965.

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The present bill contemplates, under the Western Hemisphere rule, only those countries which are independent and thus continues the hardship on the small island areas which can never become independent because of their accident of location, size and lack of natural resources. Yet, from 1921 to 1924, these adjacent islands enjoyed the same benefits as the rest of the Western Hemisphere. These islands will be grouped now ultimately into the world quota and, as a consequence, face a potential of no possibility of immigration to the United States.

It does seem incongruous that less than one-half of 1 percent of the total Western Hemisphere population should be excluded from consideration with the other 99½ percent.

I do not propose to offer my amendment from the floor at this time. Nothing should impede the progress of this legislation. I intend, however, to introduce legislation in the next session to allow people from the adjacent islands to immigrate as do all others from the Western Hemisphere nations. We should not permit such petty inequities to continue. I hope others will join me in this effort.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry. Is the rule of germaneness still in effect?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time under the rule of germaneness expired 9 minutes ago.

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I rise in defense of the position taken with respect to the actions of the United States in the Dominican Republic by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT].

To my deep regret, this puts me in opposition to my good friends the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD].

I had occasion to call to the attention of Senators earlier this week a most interesting article which appeared in the Sunday magazine section of the New York Times, written by the able and veteran reporter, Tom Wicker, the principal Capitol Hill reporter for the New York Times, entitled "Winds of Change in the Senate."

In his article Mr. Wicker commented, and I think with reason, that the art of debate appears to have been more or less lost in this body to which I am so proud to belong.

Possibly even by speaking to a completely empty Chamber on a Friday afternoon—which I regret to state is

usually the case when I rise to address the Senate—I hope I can do a little to revive the tradition of debate which down through the years has made our legislative body an institution of which I hope the American people are still proud.

Before addressing myself to the substance of the disagreement between the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and the three other Senators whom I have mentioned, I should like to make four preliminary remarks.

First, nobody—I repeat nobody—least of all the Senator from Arkansas—has attacked the President of the United States for what he did in the Dominican crisis. The position of the Senator from Arkansas, with which I agree, is that the President got bad advice—very bad advice. But having received that advice from individuals in his administration whom he had good reason to trust, particularly advice with respect to facts which turned out to be wrong, the President had no alternative except to do pretty much what he did. Therefore, I would make it clear that neither the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] nor I, despite what the three Senators have said to the contrary, have said one single word in criticism of the President.

My second point is that what may or may not have happened when the President called certain legislative leaders to the White House to discuss the crisis in the Dominican Republic, after he had decided to send the Marines in, but before they had actually gone, is entirely irrelevant to the points raised by the Senator from Arkansas. The Senator from Arkansas has no responsibility whatever for the decision made at the White House. He was in no position at that point to disagree with what the President recommended, because his sources of information were no different from those of the President. I believe it grossly unfair for the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] and the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] to criticize the Senator from Arkansas for having remained silent at the White House after the President announced he was going to send in the troops.

In fact, the Senator from Arkansas said in his speech that he agrees that it was probably necessary to send a small force of Marines into Santo Domingo to protect American lives, particularly in view of the intelligence information, much of it inaccurate, which had come to the White House at that time. I agree with that, too. I believe we were under an obligation, despite our treaty obligations to the contrary, to send in a small force to protect American lives.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that no American lives were lost. Despite the gross exaggeration with respect to the alleged danger under which Americans and other foreigners found themselves in Santo Domingo in those critical days toward the end of April, not one single American life was lost.

So I reiterate that, in my opinion, the Senator from Arkansas is subject to no just criticism because he did not object when the President, at the White House, announced that he had decided to send in the Marines. This argument is espe-

cially irrelevant to any issue raised by the Senator from Arkansas in his carefully thought-through and closely reasoned speech. I hope we shall hear no more in criticism of the Senator from Arkansas for what he did or did not do at the White House conference.

My third preliminary comment is that the Senator from Arkansas based his speech on 6 weeks of testimony in executive session before the Committee on Foreign Relations, at which practically every witness from the administration who participated in the Dominican crisis, with three exceptions, was heard and examined at some length by members of the committee. The speech was based also on newspaper articles, weekly news magazine articles, and other information from reputable American journalists, information which was available to the Committee on Foreign Relations as well as to the three Senators I have mentioned.

I sat through those hearings. I either heard the testimony—and I usually did hear the testimony and the cross-examination—of each of the witnesses, or, if I could not be present, I went to the committee room later and read the testimony, including the cross-examination. I can testify from my own personal knowledge that the comments of the Senator from Arkansas are fully and accurately documented by the classified record in the files of the Committee on Foreign Relations. If any Senator doubts what I say, I urge him or her to read that record.

I do not know whether the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], or the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] have read that record. Perhaps they will tell us in due course. However, I do know that, with the possible exception of a total of approximately one-half hour, when one of those Senators may have been present at one of those hearings, they did not show up at all. Therefore, their criticism of what the Senator from Arkansas has said is not based on any knowledge of that record in the Committee on Foreign Relations.

This is not necessarily a cause for serious criticism. No doubt the Senators have other sources of information than those which were available to me and to the Senator from Arkansas and to the members of the committee. They are certainly entitled to come in on the floor of the Senate and say whatever they think about it.

The point I want to make is that every single statement of the Senator from Arkansas is carefully documented in the official record of the hearings over which he presided. I raise several questions as to whether these other three Senators can document what they have said.

The fourth preliminary point that I should like to make is that the real issue with respect to the Dominican Republic is not: "Did we do the right thing or did we not do the right thing? Did we, as the Senator from Arkansas says, react too slowly in the first place and then overreact in the second place? Were our activities on the whole in the best

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interests of the United States of America or not?" These are not the issues.

The real issue is, Where do we go from here? What have we done, if anything, by this action to downgrade the influence of the United States of America through all of Latin America? And what can we do to remedy the harm?

If, as I firmly believe, we have lost many friends and made some enemies, what can we do to remedy that situation so that we can get back to the foreign policy to which John Fitzgerald Kennedy so ably led us when he advocated and pressed through Congress the Alliance for Progress bill, when he revived the good neighbor policy of his predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when he offered the hand of friendship to those democratic nations of Latin America which believe that through social, economic, and political democracy Latin America can arise and defeat communism.

I ask the question whether we help defeat communism by standing up for a landed oligarchy governed by military Junta groups which have come to be known in Latin America not as guerrillas, but as gorillas, by defying and suppressing efforts for land reform, for housing reform, for education, for health, for feeding the poor, by keeping in office economically as well as politically discredited oligarchies, or do we do better in the interest of the United States in supporting men like Betancourt, and Leoni in Venezuela, and Belaunde in Peru, and the successors of Jose Figueres in Costa Rica, and Frei Montalva and other splendid Latin Americans who are pressing to carry into effect the principles of the Alliance for Progress? Or do we do better if we put our blue chips on the military who come back, having learned the American way of life at the Command and General Staff School in Leavenworth?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Louisiana that I am most happy that he is on the floor.

I have a prepared address that I should like to deliver. Nevertheless, I should be very glad to yield to my friend from Louisiana, and I am sure that with that self-restraint for which he is so well known, he will ask a few questions and I shall do what I can to reply, and then I shall be permitted to continue.

I now yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I regret that I could not be here when the Senator commenced his address. I was attending a hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations which dealt with the problem of wheat shipments to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. CLARK. I was present this morning at the same hearing and made my position clear. I hope that, in that event at least, the Senator from Louisiana and I will find ourselves on the same side.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I hope that we can discuss it. Perhaps we can agree.

As the Senator indicated, I did not have the opportunity to sit through the

hearings to which he has referred. I have consulted with people who were either there and have read the record. I am not completely in the dark about what occurred in those hearings.

The Senator knows that I am the ranking member on the Committee on Finance. During that period I was attending hearings of the Finance Committee and also representing the Senate in conference with the House on a number of major bills and conference reports, some of which are now at the desk.

I would like to have been present at the hearings, but I was not able to be there. During that same period of time I was attending meetings at the White House, as the assistant majority leader, and I did have available to me the same information which was available to the President.

My judgment of this situation is simply this: That what started in this area as a revolution by people who were not Communists, but who were seeking to overthrow what could perhaps be described as a rightwing government.

Mr. CLARK. Is the Senator referring to the Reid Cabral government?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I was referring to the so-called military junta.

Mr. CLARK. To the junta which succeeded the military government.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator is correct. The three Communist Parties in that country moved in on this situation, as Communists always seek to do when chaos exists. They had gained a great deal of power and were on their way toward achieving control of this revolution.

The military junta group requested our Government to go in. Our Government inquired, "Are you requesting us to go in because you can no longer protect the Americans who are there?"

As I understand it, even the Senator from Arkansas does not dispute that the answer to that question was yes, and that it was proper that the United States send troops.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, from the attention that I was able to give to the problem, I understood that the Reid Cabral government had fallen for reasons which we do not need to go into. The government under Moreno Urillo, who was the legitimate successor of Bosch, thinking that it was defeated, had taken refuge in other Latin American and foreign embassies. At the instance of the CIA—I believe it can be documented—a new junta headed by a certain Colonel Benoit had been formed, although it was pretty well confined to the San Isidro air base. That junta sent word to Ambassador Bennett, "You had better send American troops in because a Communist takeover threatens."

Ambassador Bennett sent word back, "I can't get away with bringing Americans in on that ground because the evidence is not clear. If you will change your request and make it in writing, and ask American forces to intervene in order to protect American lives, then I believe that we can persuade Washington to do it."

So Benoit changed his position and put

it on the basis of protecting American lives. Bennett forwarded that post haste to the State Department and to the White House, and troops were sent in.

The President announced that he was doing it to protect American lives. However, Bennett also sent to Washington the original statement of Colonel Benoit, and, the day the troops landed, a totally unauthorized statement was made by one of the chief naval officers of the U.S. Navy in Santo Domingo that we were going in to crush the Communists.

It is all very well to talk about protecting American lives, but the real reason that the marines went in there was to prevent a Communist takeover.

At that point Admiral Rayburn, who had been sworn in as the new head of the CIA perhaps 24 hours before that—and a fine man he is; no doubt he had to rely entirely on the information which was coming to him from Santo Domingo—was able to produce the names of only three Communists who were said to be connected with the revolutionary movement. This was obviously not enough to impress the American people. Seventy-two hours later, they produced the names of 58 Communists, and thus made a somewhat better showing.

I do not have a shadow of a doubt that after we did what we did, by sending in around 20,000 troops, the three tiny Communist parties in the Dominican Republic, one of them Castro dominated, one of them Moscow dominated, one of them China dominated, were able to take such advantage of the confusion and lack of order in downtown Santo Domingo. The fact is that a lot of the Bosch people became scared and ran away to embassies because they thought they were defeated. I have no doubt that thereafter, the rebel movement was very strongly influenced by the Communists. But it was not in the beginning, and actually the Communists never deposed Caamaño Deno, the constitutional leader who is not a Communist.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. My understanding of the matter was that the Communists had gained a great amount of control, and were in command in a substantial number of positions, many of them key positions in the revolution.

Based on what little we know, when we look at a situation of that sort, the revolution had more the earmarks of a Communist takeover than had Castro's, when Castro was taking over Cuba.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator made that argument very eloquently the other day on the floor. All I can say is, my sources of information are possibly different than his. I know this is the information put forth by the administration, and particularly by Mr. Thomas Mann, who was the architect of our policy. I merely disagree with it.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. It is a matter of judgment. Perhaps the Senator would agree with me, that when the President of the United States becomes convinced, first, that American lives are in danger, he has a duty to protect those American lives; and, second, when he becomes convinced that failure to act means he is risking a Communist takeover of another nation in this hemi-

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sphere, in my judgment, if he fails to act, he is failing to discharge his responsibility to the American people.

In my judgment, had President Eisenhower known that the Castro takeover in Cuba was going to work out the way it did, things might have been different.

There were in the Castro movement a number of Communists who claimed they were not Communists—Castro claimed he was not a Communist. He lied to us. That is part of the Communist technique.

As a matter of fact, under Communist doctrine, as I am sure the Senator knows, truth from the Communist viewpoint is that which advances the spread of communism. So, if I say this man taking these notes is a man, if that does not promote the spread of communism, from the Communist point of view I have told a lie; according to Communist teaching, I should have said, "That's a woman."

Castro used those techniques on us. We did not know who all the Communists were in the Dominican Republic, but we knew many of them. Some were Castro-trained. As the Senator pointed out, some of them were the Peiping-type Communists, who would blast us off the face of the earth tomorrow if they had enough atom bombs, and some were the Russian type, experts in subversion. But they had enough help that they were in the process of taking over the revolution. That was the information available to the President; and if the Senator will check, he will find out that is what was happening.

If what the Dominican people want is a progressive reform government, a government with liberal ideas, such as the Senator has and as I myself have, then the people will have the opportunity to elect that sort of government and, in my judgment, they will be able to thank the United States of America that they have that opportunity, because if those Communists had taken over they would never have had it.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator made this same argument very eloquently on the floor of the Senate just a few days ago. I respect his integrity and his conviction. I said, perhaps before the Senator came in, that I thought he and the Senator from Florida were quite unfair to the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] by trying to throw the blame on him for not objecting to sending in the troops when he was summoned to the White House with some of the other leaders in the last days of April.

I pointed out then, and I point out again, that nobody is attacking the President of the United States—neither the Senator from Arkansas nor I. He said and I say that if we had had to make our decision on the basis of the information that came to him at the time he determined to send the troops in, we would have sent troops in, too. I do not think we would have sent so many, but we certainly would have sent in some.

I think the Senator from Florida and the Senator from Louisiana really do a disservice and an injustice to the Senator from Arkansas by trying to say that he or I or anybody else is attacking the

President of the United States, or that he or I or anybody else should have spoken up before the troops went in.

That is not the issue. The issue is: Was the advice that came to the President of the United States accurate? I say it was not. Were the recommendations that came to him from his subordinates sound? I say they were not.

But with the information he had, he had no other choice.

With respect to the position of the Senator from Louisiana about Castro's Cuba, it seems to me that is largely irrelevant and, in the end, the difference of opinion between the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Louisiana is just this simple: Whose judgment is right?

I firmly believe that had we not done what we did in the Dominican Republic in the last days of April, the posture of the United States throughout Latin America would be far higher today than it is. Santo Domingo would have had the kind of government we wanted months before it did, and the whole posture of our relationship with the world in general, but with Latin America in particular, would have been better.

I point out to the Senator from Louisiana, as he knows, that I am a staunch supporter of the Johnson administration, as is the Senator from Louisiana. Every now and then, we stray off the reservation a little bit, but most of the time, we are supporting the President and his program, and the Great Society.

But if the balance of powers and the separation of powers means anything, then the Senator from Louisiana and I have not only the right but the duty to speak our minds when we disagree with the policy laid down by the Chief Executive; and with deep regret, that is what I am doing now. I say to my friend from Louisiana, I shall be back on the team on Monday when the immigration bill comes up. I hope he will be there, too, with me.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. May I say to the Senator that it seems to me that fundamentally, his case is to establish that the Communists had no substantial influence, and were not achieving increased influence, in that revolutionary group. If he cannot establish that; if the contrary was true, and the Communists were achieving more and more power in that revolt, it seems to me the Senator has not established his case, but rather the case which supports the President and his advisers.

Mr. CLARK. Let me say, with all the deep affection I feel for my friend from Louisiana, that I do not think I have to make any case. The case has been made by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. All I am doing now is to rebut the efforts of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] in their attack on the case made by the Senator from Arkansas.

I stand foursquare on the speech made by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Senator from Louisiana has ably attempted to oppose that

case. But I am not here making any case at all. I stand foursquare on what I consider the brilliant, able, and constructive speech made by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Did the Senator from Pennsylvania hear the speech of the Senator from Ohio on the floor today?

Mr. CLARK. Which Senator from Ohio?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE].

Mr. CLARK. No; but out of the deep affection and high regard that I have for my close friend the senior Senator from Ohio, I shall certainly be happy to read his speech. I am sorry I did not hear it. I certainly would not wish to prejudge the position taken by my good friend from Ohio, but I can say, generally speaking, that in matters of this sort the senior Senator from Ohio and I rarely find ourselves in agreement.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Senator aware of the speech made by the majority leader today in support of the President's action? It seems to me that the Senator ought to be aware of the fact that he is answering more than three Senators.

Mr. CLARK. If it is necessary to answer five, I shall be glad to take on five. As the colloquy thus far indicates, I am having great difficulty taking on one Senator, my good friend from Louisiana.

Now, Mr. President, I return to the major part of my speech. I suggest that the three Senators I have mentioned have not only failed to refute the seven specific conclusions reached by the Senator from Arkansas, but for the most part have refused to meet him head on and have tended to go off on irrelevant side channels having nothing whatever to do with the major impact of the speech of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT].

Let me give an example. The Senators from Louisiana and Florida have both argued that there was need for hasty action in that fatal last week of April of this year, and that there was no time to evaluate the situation judiciously. Then they make the basic and I believe false assumption that the only rapid form of action which could be taken was that which was taken; namely, massive military intervention on the side of the militarists who had kicked out the only legitimate, democratically elected government the Dominican Republic had had in the course of 38 years.

Actually, the Senator from Arkansas criticized the administration for timidity as well as for overreaction. He pointed out that we should have moved long before we did to support the legitimate government of the Dominican Republic, represented in the first stages of the revolution by the acting president, Molina Urena.

The Senator from Arkansas pointed out that there were two opportunities, first, on April 25, when the PRD, which was the Bosch party, and the only really democratic party of the moderate left in the Dominican Republic, requested a

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U.S. presence, by which they meant our Government's support for return to constitutional government under Bosch; and, second, 2 days later, on April 27, when the constitutionalists—sometimes erroneously called the rebels—thinking themselves defeated, appealed to Ambassador Bennett for mediation, a request which he refused on the ground that it would have constituted intervention.

Thus, the Senator from Arkansas called not for inaction, but for even more rapid action, which was eventually taken—and on the wrong side.

The issue is not whether it should have been action, but what kind of action. The administration ended intervening in a massive way with military forces on April 28. The Senator from Arkansas would have had us intervene politically either 1 or 3 days earlier.

The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] contends, on page 23007 of the RECORD, and the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] suggested, on page 5 of a Judiciary subcommittee document entitled "Organization of American States Combined Reports on Communist Subversion," that the OAS mediation team sent to Santo Domingo, by the 10th meeting of consultation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics wholly and completely justified the unilateral intervention of the United States in Santo Domingo. But, a reading of the report establishes, clearly indeed, that this is not the fact. The report describes the situation as one of chaos in security replete with human suffering. It supports the efforts of members of the OAS committee to bring about a cease-fire. It contains a proposal for the dispatching of an inter-American force which, in fact, had already been decided upon, but it contains no statement whatever endorsing the unilateral action of the United States, although the two Senators I have mentioned state categorically that the committee's report did exactly that.

Critics of the Senator from Arkansas contend that there was clear danger to American lives in Santo Domingo, and that this was the prime reason for the intervention of the United States. I have dealt with that comment earlier in this talk. I can only say now that I agree with the Senator from Arkansas that there was danger to Americans, although no American was, in fact, killed or wounded until after the marines went in and started exchanging fire with the constitutional forces.

I say that on the basis of Monday morning quarterbacking—and I agree that what I am doing, what the Senator from Arkansas did, and to some extent what the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] have been doing is Monday morning quarterbacking—on the basis of a calm and judicious review of what happened, there is very little doubt that the principal motive for American intervention was to save military and dictatorial forces in the Dominican Republic from a military defeat.

Ambassador Bennett requested walkie-talkies for the military junta, and he got them. When Colonel Benoit, then head of the military junta, asked for American intervention, he got it. He got it on a ground which, to put it mildly, was not a candid statement of the facts.

In any case, it is a documented fact that Ambassador Bennett, on April 27, when the militarists were winning, refused to intervene to support the constitutional government which was the successor of the only democratically elected government the Dominican Republic had had for over a generation.

Then, the next day, when it looked as though the Constitutionalists were going to win, Ambassador Bennett pleaded desperately and successfully for intervention on the side of the militarists.

The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] states in the RECORD, on page 23295, and not for the first time, that the Senator from Arkansas' criticism of the recommendations of the President's advisers is organically related to a document entitled "Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic," which was prepared by the staff Committee on Foreign Relations, with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Service.

The Senator suggests that this documentation and supporting chronology have been heavily slanted against the administration by the careful process of editorial selection.

I hold in my hand the document in question. It starts out with what I believe all will admit to be a definitely nonpartisan statement, that on December 5, 1492, Columbus discovered America. It happened to be the island of Hispaniola, and of course he stopped off on his way at the little island in the Bahamas, San Salvador.

But I submit to any objective observer who wants to test the validity of the charge of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] that the rest of the chronology is just as objective and unslanted as the original statement which I have just read—and it is composed largely of official administration statements which may have turned out to be damaging to the administration's case, but certainly were not consciously intended to achieve that result—actually this chronology was not drawn, as the Senator from Connecticut contends, from anti-administration press sources, but, rather, primarily from a noncontroversial source entitled "Deadline Data on World Affairs," and from major metropolitan newspapers, including the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Washington Post, the Times of London, Der Welt of Hamburg, the London Economist, the London Observer, Le Monde of Paris.

I submit, and I would hope the Senator from Connecticut would agree, that these are reputable metropolitan journals, which, by and large, tend to support the administration. If they were critical of U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic, this might suggest that there is something wrong with that policy rather than that the committee and its staff, and the

editorial and reportorial writers who prepared this documentation, were biased.

Actually, as the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] pointed out, the only nonadministration witness whom the Committee on Foreign Relations heard was the former Governor of Puerto Rico, Munoz Marin, a strong supporter of the administration. I felt the committee should have heard witnesses in opposition to the administration's policy. The chairman, and I suspect a majority of our colleagues on that committee, felt that if we had opened the hearing up to press reporters who had been on the scene, we would have gotten into a Donnybrook which would have been difficult to bring to a conclusion, and the decision was made not to call the other witnesses.

I said earlier that I think there were three witnesses who should have been called. One was John Bartlow Martin, who wrote what I believe to be a highly inaccurate story of what he found in the Dominican Republic. He was down there as a representative of the administration, and upon his return, he wrote this rather extraordinary article in one of the leading outlets of the Luce publications.

I think it is a little unusual, from the protocol point of view, for a former Foreign Service officer—in fact, the former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic—to go down to the Dominican Republic, spend a week, fail in his efforts to bring peace, and then come back and write his side of the story for Life magazine.

It is not for me to criticize. I think he should have been called as a witness, and we should have had an opportunity to question him with respect to his participation in the crisis.

The second witness who I think should have been called was McGeorge Bundy, who went to the Dominican Republic at the request of the President, and spent 10 days down there, trying, unsuccessfully, to bring the crisis to an end. Mr. Bundy, in what I consider to be a disregard of the relevant precedents took refuge in executive privilege and refused to appear before the committee. At one point he said he would come and have tea with us, but then he refused even to do that.

The third witness, whom I hope we still may call when the time is right, is that wise, experienced, extraordinarily able veteran of the Foreign Service, who appears as of now, to have brought the crisis to a successful conclusion, with a display of diplomacy which evokes my admiration and I am sure that of every other member of the committee, regardless of their point of view with respect to this particular crisis, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

I hope, when the smoke settles a little and the present temporary government of President Garcia Godoy is a little more firmly on its feet, Ambassador Bunker will come and tell the Foreign Relations Committee about the situation he found when he went down there, and how he was able to bring about this near miracle, an instance of pulling a rabbit out of a

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hat, worthy, in my opinion, of the late Houdini.

The background information prepared by the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Legislative Reference Service contains excerpts from the Rio de Janeiro Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States. A reading of articles 15, 17, and 19, of the OAS Charter and of article 6 of the Rio Treaty make it clear beyond peradventure of doubt that the United States of America's unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic was illegal and unauthorized; and since these provisions of the inter-American agreements suggest unfavorable inferences about the administration's policy, perhaps the Senator from Connecticut is correct in regarding their inclusion in this document to which he objects as a reflection of prejudice upon the part of the committee and its staff.

I point out that all this week there has been meeting in the city of Washington an extraordinary group called the International Conference on World Peace Through World Law. Legal and judicial delegates from more than 110 nations attended. The President of the United States went before them yesterday morning and made an extraordinary able and moving address before that body, in which he placed the United States of America squarely on record as supporting the rule of law as against the rule of force. I was happy, indeed, to see the President of the United States take that position, and I hope from here on in the United States of America will practice what it preaches, and not talk about the rule of law out of one side of its mouth and violate it out of the other side.

Mr. President, I do not wish to be misunderstood, because I say again, as the Senator from Arkansas said before, that I believe the initial intervention, had it been solely for the purpose of protecting American lives, was justified on humanitarian grounds. My position is that when that initial intervention was multiplied by many thousands of troops, and when the ostensible objective to protect American lives was converted by advisers of the administration into an effort to intervene in a civil war to prevent an alleged Communist takeover, its illegality became obvious and apparent.

I suggest that the Senator from Connecticut, an extremely useful Member of this body and a good friend of mine, will, on second thought, want to withdraw the suggestion which he made at pages 23297 and 23298 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that the Senator from Arkansas is soft on communism.

I suggest that the freedom of both public and private men to speak out in candor, either for or against official policy, is an integral part of the American form of liberty, and also an integral part of our constitutional form of government, which requires that the Senate of the United States, as a part of the legislative branch, advise and consent to the activities of the executive.

Mr. President, in this connection I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks an edi-

torial which appeared on September 17, in the Washington Post entitled "Panic Button."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 17, 1965]

PANIC BUTTON

Senator Dodd's reply to Senator FULBRIGHT's critique of the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic is essentially to try to depict Mr. FULBRIGHT as soft on communism. This tawdry if familiar tactic does Mr. Dodd no credit. There is legitimate ground for disagreement with Mr. FULBRIGHT's analysis, which had the benefit of 4 months of hindsight, without attempting to smear his motives.

That there were, and are, Communists in the Dominican Republic no one disputes; here Mr. Dodd is tilting at the wrong windmill. What is disputed is whether they were in a position to capture the revolution that the United States in effect halted when representatives of the American Embassy induced the administration to push the panic button. Some influential anti-Communist Dominicans think they were not.

Nowhere does Mr. Dodd deal with several basic questions raised by Mr. FULBRIGHT: Did the United States fully use the resources available to it without sending in the marines—and was the administration candid with the public? Obviously the United States must be alert to Castroite maneuvers, including efforts to take over and direct local grievances. But if we allow American policy to be dominated and even paralyzed by fear of another Cuba, we shall soon find ourselves sending marines around the hemisphere losing friends and alienating people.

Mr. Dodd contends, and some in the administration agree with him, that Mr. FULBRIGHT's speech damaged the country because the criticism will be picked up abroad. On the contrary the intervention, whether or not it was necessary, is what started the process. One of the strengths of America in the eyes of other peoples—and a point that can belie Mr. FULBRIGHT's complaint that the United States appears unsympathetic to demands for social justice abroad (by contrast with the social revolution taking place at home)—is that we can debate issues publicly and seek to learn from experience. But to argue that all's well that ends well in the Dominican Republic is like insisting that because a broken leg ultimately heals it somehow is good for you.

Mr. CLARK. The editorial concludes that those who "argue that all is well that ends well in the Dominican Republic, is like insisting that because a broken leg ultimately heals it somehow is good for you."

I suggest that the criticism of our Dominican policy made by the Senator from Arkansas was healthy, salutary, and in the long run will be helpful to the administration and to the future conduct of our foreign policy in Latin America.

Senator FULBRIGHT needs no defense from me against the charge that he is soft on communism. I suspect that every one of the other 99 Senators in this body, including the Senator from Connecticut, on second thought, would stand up and defy anybody who, outside these halls, said that he was.

There is no more loyal, intelligent, and able American in our country than the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I say again that I am sure, on further reflection, that the Senator from Connecticut will wish to withdraw the implication contained in the quotation from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD which I have just made.

I further suggest that, as I said earlier, the current debate reflects great credit on the spirit of liberty and the spirit of freedom of speech in the Senate and the country at large.

In fact, the criticism of Senator FULBRIGHT is already beginning to have a positive effect in Latin America. Conversations with Latin Americans in Washington, especially the younger ones who were not tied to either the militarists or economic oligarchs, suggest that by bringing this matter into the open, as the Senator from Arkansas has done, he repairs the bitter disillusionment with the United States some of our best friends south of the border now feel. It is reviving some feeling of hope that the United States is still the friend of Latin American democracy.

This position is well developed by Senator FULBRIGHT on pages 23004 and 23005 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I suggest that the further point may now be stressed: that strong self-criticism of our country, of the administration, of its foreign policy, both in the Senate and elsewhere, is essential to clearing the air and restoring an honest and friendlier relationship between the United States and the democratic nationalist reformers who are our best friends in Latin America.

Acknowledgement of error, mistaken action, and lack of candor is not only essential to dispel lingering disillusionment, but it is also a convincing demonstration of good faith on the part of the people of the United States toward those able and dedicated Latin Americans who are devoting their lives toward establishing in that important area of the world the same kind of democratic pluralistic society of which we are so proud in the United States of America.

I conclude to some extent as I started.

The questions are not so much what did we do in the months of April, May, June, July, and August in the Dominican Republic, but first what are the implications of what we did on the future of our Latin American policy?

And second, if we did make mistakes—and I think we did—what can we now do to remedy them?

I suggest that Under Secretary of State Mann and Assistant Secretary of State Jack Vaughn would be well advised, and I hope they will be, if they devote their best efforts from here on in patching up our damaged relationships with those men in Latin America and the countries they represent who are our real friends: the democratic, the liberal, and, if you will, the slightly left-of-center leaders, not the military juntas or the oligarchical landowners, who are cheering what we did in the Dominican Republic.

I suggest we look to Belamunde Terry, Leon, Betancourt in Venezuela, Jose Figueras and his successors in Costa Rica.

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I suggest we look to President Frei, of Chile, at this moment the greatest of them all, who fought Communists to a standstill and obtained a free liberal democratic, New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, Great Society government in that magnificent and hard-pressed thin stretch of liberty in South America, a government which supports the same essential freedoms which we are so proud of here.

I suggest we look to Alberto Lleras in Colombia, and the men who support his policy there.

These are the true friends of America. These are the countries where the Alianza para el Progreso has the best chance of success. It is here that we should be looking to bolster American policy, to give these men and these countries our assistance, to hearten them, and congratulate them, because that is where the friends of the United States of America are located.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 39 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, September 20, 1965, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate September 17, 1965:

U.S. ATTORNEY

William H. Murdock, of North Carolina, to be U.S. attorney for the middle district of North Carolina for the term of 4 years. (Reappointment.)

William Medford, of North Carolina, to be U.S. attorney for the western district of North Carolina for the term of 4 years. (Reappointment.)

I nominate the following-named persons to be postmasters:

ALASKA

Herbert Apassingok, Sr., Gambell, Alaska, in place of John Apangalook, resigned.

ARIZONA

Homer L. Fancher, Bullhead City, Ariz., in place of B. E. Fox, retired.

CALIFORNIA

Dorothy M. Collis, Brentwood, Calif., in place of R. J. Wallace, retired.

Maynard Green, Covina, Calif., in place of C. G. McCarn, retired.

Theodore F. Locicero, Monterey, Calif., in place of L. S. Brown, retired.

Ellen C. Cothran, Westmorland, Calif., in place of F. F. Johnson, deceased.

COLORADO

Susan L. Thompson, Frisco, Colo., in place of R. S. Foote, retired.

James A. Guadnola, Grand Junction, Colo., in place of H. W. Cross, retired.

Robert W. Shewfelt, Parker, Colo., in place of Sophia Johnson, retired.

CONNECTICUT

Vincent P. Nolan, Southington, Conn., in place of E. C. Butler, deceased.

IDAHO

Daniel K. Wilson, Lapwai, Idaho, in place of C. F. Angel, retired.

ILLINOIS

Joseph A. Stal, Georgetown, Ill., in place of A. T. Humrichous, retired.

Marlin H. Ferguson, Hartford, Ill., in place of P. L. Reilly, deceased.

KENTUCKY

Franklin A. Orndorff, Adairville, Ky., in place of J. R. Trimble, retired.

MAINE

Chester W. Curtis, Richmond, Maine, in place of Don O. Cate, retired.

MASSACHUSETTS

Friedland C. Peltier, Oxford, Mass., in place of R. C. Taft, retired.

William F. Griffin, Rutland, Mass., in place of D. M. Lincoln, retired.

MICHIGAN

Leonard E. Amidon, Interlochen, Mich., in place of R. J. Buller, retired.

James R. Budak, Lakeside, Mich., in place of M. B. Perham, retired.

Calvin P. Leach, Le Roy, Mich., in place of H. B. Erickson, retired.

Mark C. Dilts, Mesick, Mich., in place of Ernest Bevilive, retired.

Lawrence A. Frith, Vermontville, Mich., in place of R. K. Kilpatrick, transferred.

MISSISSIPPI

William T. Hudspeth, Hickory Flat, Miss., in place of N. L. Hall, retired.

MISSOURI

John Rowlett, Jr., Maitland, Mo., in place of H. R. Cowan, retired.

NEBRASKA

Audrey A. Adams, Lyman, Nebr., in place of B. E. McKee, deceased.

Theodore R. Gaedke, Wellfleet, Nebr., in place of P. D. Coder, transferred.

NEW YORK

William B. Chavis, Long Eddy, N.Y., in place of S. F. Kenney, retired.

NORTH CAROLINA

William E. Twiford, Kill Devil Hills, N.C., in place of I. L. Twiford, retired.

NORTH DAKOTA

Edward A. Seel, Rugby, N. Dak., in place of H. D. Walland, retired.

OHIO

Henry C. Waggoner, Amsterdam, Ohio, in place of R. N. Croskey, resigned.

Carl J. Burkhardt, Leavittsburg, Ohio, in place of C. M. Burkhardt, retired.

Willard C. Geis, Massillon, Ohio, in place of J. E. Snee, retired.

William P. Moran, Roseville, Ohio, in place of M. D. Sowers, deceased.

OKLAHOMA

Charles M. McCurdy, Tupelo, Okla., in place of M. J. Flinch, deceased.

PENNSYLVANIA

C. Jean Steinkirchner, Jennerstown, Pa., in place of E. K. Hay, retired.

SOUTH DAKOTA

LaVerne V. Johannessen, Erwin, S. Dak., in place of Catherine Kazuerzak, retired.

TENNESSEE

Robert M. Sams, Dandridge, Tenn., in place of R. S. Hill, deceased.

Harold A. Hutcheson, Soddy, Tenn., in place of J. H. Davenport, retired.

TEXAS

Edison Monroe, Eustace, Tex., in place of W. H. Wheeler, deceased.

Harold A. Dosane, Jr., Haslet, Tex., in place of H. M. George, Jr., removed.

UTAH

Pete L. Bruno, Price, Utah, in place of William Grogan, retired.

Ernest R. Farnsworth, Santaquin, Utah, in place of R. J. Peterson, retired.

WASHINGTON

David L. Gray, Beardan, Wash., in place of L. A. Schultz, retired.

WEST VIRGINIA

William S. Penn, Jr., Bluefield, W. Va., in place of H. B. Faulkner, retired.

Charles H. Gillilan, Jr., Frankford, W. Va., in place of C. H. Gillilan, deceased.

WISCONSIN

Silas J. Paul, Montfort, Wis., in place of Harvey DeVall, retired.

Richard H. Vollmer, Mukwonago, Wis., in place of W. H. Ruppert, retired.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate September 17, 1965:

U.S. COAST GUARD

The following-named officers to be permanent commissioned officers in the Coast Guard in the grade indicated:

To be lieutenants

Charles F. Reid.

Warren H. Madson.

To be lieutenants (junior grade)

Vincent E. Abraham — Gary L. Rowe

son Carl D. Bossard

John R. Malloy III — Richard S. Bizar

Roy L. Foote

The nominations beginning John J. Soitys, Jr., to be lieutenant (junior grade), and ending Ted B. Bryant to be lieutenant (junior grade), which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 31, 1965.

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the promise of a rich and fertile land for the people who live there.

But when I look back on our common history since World War II, what I'm impressed with is not the troubles or the problems—the world has always had those. I'm impressed with the new element in international relations: the steady effort, crystallized in our mutual development programs, our aid programs, by independent countries to work together on solving problems.

That is new, and different, and a cause for optimism.

For our part, I can assure you that we approach our role in the development partnership in the same way we have learned to view our investment in the development of our own cities. We don't see this as something we are doing for somebody else. We see it as an investment in our own future and in the world we share with you.

In closing, may I say this: The American character is one of activism and, sometimes, impatience. It is one which leads us, from time to time, into mistakes. It is one, I am sure, which is often not fully understood in other places.

But I want to leave this message with you: We Americans are committed—committed beyond recall—to the building of a freer, better, happier world for all men.

There have been times, I know, when you may have doubted this. But today, as never before, our American Nation has come to appreciate the oneness of mankind. This appreciation makes possible the great national programs we undertake today to build better cities, to fight poverty, to eliminate discrimination in our own society, to do something on behalf of our fellow men.

And today, as never before, we know that we cannot live rich in a world too long poor.

I, for one, mean to do in my lifetime whatever I can to extend mankind's benefits to more of mankind. And I am joined by the overwhelming majority of the American people. I am joined, certainly, by our President.

Let us, then, together pledge ourselves to creating the world of justice, hope and peace that all men long for, but have not yet achieved.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

AMENDMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 2580) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the bill.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2580).

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], who is to be recognized to make some remarks at this time, will yield without losing the right to the floor or having the time for the quorum call taken out of the time allotted to him, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Ohio. *[Signature]*

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, on the floor of the Senate within the last few days there has been a discussion of what the conditions were in the Dominican Republic in April, when the U.S. Government determined to send in its Marines. A statement was made that an erroneous judgment was reached by the President because he was misinformed as to the purpose in sending in the troops. I must express vigorous disagreement with that argument.

I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and had the opportunity of listening to the representatives of the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the CIA in describing what took place in the Dominican Republic when the revolt of last spring began.

I can say unhesitatingly to Senators on the floor of the Senate that the proof was clear and convincing that unless we had stepped in we would have at our shores another Cuba.

We know of the difficulties that are facing us because of Cuba. In my judgment, those difficulties would be multiplied many times if another Castro and Cuba were established within 100 miles of the banks of our land on the south.

When the coup began it was led by persons who were not connected with the Communist Party. But it is an established fact that there were three groups in Cuba.

One group was known as the 14th of June movement with complete fidelity to Castro. Its members obtained guerrilla training in Cuba, especially in the year of 1964. That group is oriented to Castro and is Communist. It is the largest of the extremists parties, but does contain some non-Communist members.

The second group, that was latent and hidden in the Dominican Republic, was the PSPD, oriented to Moscow. Its members received training in Czechoslovakia in 1963. Others obtained indoctrination in Moscow in 1964.

Then, there was a third group, the APCJ, oriented to Peiping. Members of the APCJ went to Communist China late in 1964, where they received guerrilla military training.

We thus have the situation with three groups in the Dominican Republic led by Communists, with some of their members non-Communists. They were hidden, waiting for action. When the coup began, they immediately sprung to the forefront, and within a few days they were occupying the leading positions in what was happening.

When the military members of the coup began distributing arms, these three Communist oriented organizations were in the frontline. Their leaders

were distributing military equipment, and they were seen at vital places in command. All of the indications were that they were practically in control.

Military equipment was delivered to them in large quantities and taken to their headquarters, where it was distributed to their members, many of whom were Communists, and others who did not know exactly what was in the making.

There has been some criticism, particularly in the press, about the relatively small number of Communists identified as having taken part in the rebellion in the Dominican Republic.

In my judgment we miss the seriousness of the revolutionary situation by adding up the number of Communists that were identified in it.

When we add the number, we completely miss the point about the ability of Communist leaders to dominate a situation where disorder, rioting, and mob rule prevails. By skilled manipulation, propaganda, by assertion of leadership in proper points, in street fighting, by aggressive activity, these Communists take hold. That is what they did in the Dominican Republic.

A few skilled people can do this in the proper circumstances. In the Dominican Republic the circumstances were existent, enabling the Communists to seize the leadership, and to install their government.

When a temporary government was established in April, in charge of the investigative forces, there was placed at its head the most ardent Communist of the whole group.

That is a technique of Communist activity which is generally understood: Get control of the police; get control of the investigating agency; and when there is control of them, begin arresting all citizens who are in disagreement with the party in control who have the potential ability of interfering.

I merely want to remind Senators of what has happened in Cuba. Castro immediately arrested 500 of the leaders whom he thought would cause trouble to him. He had a hippodrome trial. The 500 persons were put to death under the semblance of the administration of justice, when it was nothing but the act of a tyrant, giving the semblance of a trial to the accused, with all judgments foreordained, and then putting them to death.

I have already stated that the man that was placed at the head of the investigative forces was one of the leading Communists in the Dominican Republic.

But one word about the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. They were called by the chairman of the committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. The committee did not make the decision to hold the hearings.

I regret to say this, but it is nevertheless my judgment, that the meeting was contemplated to establish that we were in the Dominican Republic by error and injustice.

Someone had prepared a sheaf of cards, I should say 1½ inches thick. When the witnesses appeared, the questions on the cards were systematically

asked. One question was read, and the card was turned over. Then the second question was read, and the third. I should say that 150 cards were in the sheaf. Every question contained implications about the impropriety of the presence of the United States in the Dominican Republic.

During the hearing, I complained about what was taking place. One of the questions asked was: "Did not Mr. X, of Y newspaper make this statement?" The statement of Mr. X made had challenged the presence of the United States in the Dominican Republic. I intervened and asked, "Is it not also true that another newspaperman during the Cuban episode, said that Castro was a Lincoln and a Robin Hood, devoted to the cause of the poor, robbing the rich, and turning his gains over to those who were in need?"

Certain newspapermen have said that we were improperly in Cuba and in the Dominican Republic. But our plight in Cuba, in my opinion, is the primary consequence of a misevaluation we made of Castro. Castro came to the United States and was given the dignity of appearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. I deliberately did not attend that meeting. I could not dignify Castro's appearance before the Committee on Foreign Relations, having in my mind the knowledge of the circus trial that he had conducted.

Castro was a guest of the National Press Club. During the entire time he was here, the stories told about him were, in effect, that to Cuba had come a messiah gifted with charitable qualities; a friend of the free West; a friend of the United States. We took those stories as true. The result is the problem which now exists in Cuba.

I am firmly of the conviction that if the President had not acted as he did in April of this year, we now would have practically at our shores another Cuba. I cannot agree with the statements made by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT] on the floor of the Senate on September 15. I do not believe that I am what may be called a hard realist; but I do not want to be labeled as a soft-minded idealist, one who is absolutely indifferent to realistic facts. I would feel myself to be a dupe if I daily believed what the Communists of the world are saying. The Communists have their techniques. They know how to operate subversively. They know how to foment riots. They are fomenting them in the United States. All that is needed is some small disorder followed by an invasion of well-equipped technicians who know how to exaggerate a situation; and before one knows it, mobs are in action. It was mobs that took charge of the Dominican Republic uprising.

I say to the people of my State that while I have agreed with many of the things that have been recommended by

the administration on this subject, I now stand foursquare behind what was done. I do so in the belief that it was serviceable as a security to our country and to the free world.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. First, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Ohio for the presentation he has made today. As a Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I have watched, listened, and read with more than uncommon interest the discussions emanating from the other side of the aisle concerning the activities in which the United States was engaged in the Dominican Republic, and the criticisms and replies which have been made with respect to that action.

While I dislike to inject myself into what is pretty much a Democratic discussion, it does, after all, relate to hearings which were held in the Committee on Foreign Relations. I attended most of the hearings. They involved a rather searching analysis of what transpired in the early days of revolutionary activities in Santo Domingo and other parts of the Dominican Republic. I was curious about the nature of the hearings and the reasons for them, because, while I was in attendance for many hours, I heard no questions directed to the long series of witnesses as to what they felt our future policy should be or what they felt the solution ought to be, so far as the aftermath of the revolutionary period was concerned.

It all seemed to be a questioning in a somewhat critical search for knowledge as to why we got into the affair in the first place; whether we got in with the right number of people and at the right time; and whether the information that caused us to go in at all was accurate or inaccurate. The inquiry seemed to be principally a contest as to whether the writings of little men in the employ of big newspapers was correct so far as the situation in Santo Domingo was concerned; and whether the reports from the CIA, the State Department, and the OAS were accurate.

At the end of the hearings, I felt completely convinced, as did the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], that all the verities and all the facts seemed to be with the representatives of the Department of State and the American Government, rather than in the proclamations being made by the little men who were writing for big newspapers.

I concurred in and completely supported emphatically the action of President Johnson and the actions of the State Department, so far as their immediate reaction to the situation in the Dominican Republic was concerned. I believe they did the right thing in the right place at the right time with the right number of military personnel.

I am inclined to question a little some

of the latter day activities of the Government so far as they relate to problems existing in the Dominican Republic. I dislike to see my Government connected with a so-called kidnapping operation, in which one of the valiant fighters for freedom, Wessin y Wessin, was rather forcibly removed from the land of his origin and transferred to American soil.

As I understand the facts, he walked to the plane which took him out of the Dominican Republic. However, he walked reluctantly and involuntarily, and apparently with a bayonet which bore the imprimatur "made in the United States" at his back.

I dislike to see our Government injecting itself to that degree and in that manner in an activity which was certainly pleasing to the revolutionaries of the Dominican Republic and pleasing to the Communists. I am not a great advocate of Wessin y Wessin. I do not know how good a military leader he was. He would not be my candidate for President of the Dominican Republic if I were sitting at a political convention selecting nominees.

I should think that, slowly but surely, Uncle Sam would be learning that we do not make very many good guesses when we inject ourselves in that fashion and that forcefully into the internal affairs of another country. We should have learned something, I should think, from our experiences in Vietnam when we were permitting or promoting the ousting of Diem. We have never since then found a successor who seemed to have the capacity to develop the loyalty of his followers and fellow citizens that Diem possessed.

My skepticism is enhanced when I reflect that, with respect to Tshombe in the Congo, we spent much time, effort, and money in apparently kicking him out. Then, after we had created a vacuum, we spent much time, effort, and money in bringing him back. We were certainly wrong in either one instance or in the other so far as Tshombe in the Congo was concerned.

The Senator from Ohio pointed out that, in the situation in Cuba while we were making a transfer from Batista, who was bad, to Castro, who was worse, there was an apparent failure on the part of American officials generally to recognize that we were permitting or promoting there the control of Cuba by a Communist who had been trained in Communist training camps and who was completely dedicated to the Communist cause and subservient to the Russian Communist whiplash.

I am not at all sure that this administration is acting wisely or prudently or properly in conjunction with the Dominican Republic situation, since we took the initial action and since we put down the resolution and stabilized the situation. If, in fact, we are now to have a coalition government in Santo Domingo, we shall have failed to have secured the dividend which should have been available from

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the very wise and prudent and proper action which President Johnson originally took. I am not charging that we are going to do that. I am concerned about the way in which we moved in on Wessin y Wessin. It is a straw in the wind because of the indication that the little writers for the big newspapers are having influence with people in big places in Washington.

I dislike to see that kind of indication. We should make sure that the people in the Dominican Republic have a democratically inclined, freedom-loving friend of freedom as their leader, and we should not dilute his capacity for success by making further concessions to the defeated Communist influences in that revolution.

Primarily I am glad that the distinguished Senator from Ohio has helped to set the record straight. He has related accurately what transpired in the Committee on Foreign Relations, in my opinion. I saw no evidence throughout the hearings to indicate that President Johnson had acted either inadvisedly or on inadequate information in making the decisions that he made in those early critical days.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I do not want my statement to be construed as indicating approval or disapproval of what has recently happened. I have not had an opportunity to learn from the State Department what has taken place. However, I have apprehension about the removal of Wessin y Wessin. At this time, I should like to read some notes which I made when Bosch's government was overthrown several years ago. These are my notes concerning General Wessin y Wessin:

Wessin is about 33 years old. He was active in trying to drive the Trujillos and the Communists out of the army of the Dominican Republic. He wanted to raise the moral fabric of the army. He wrote an article pointing out the infiltration into the army of Communists. He is still the head of the Aviation School of the Military Division. He was a colonel and is now a general. He could have been the head of the government, but he declined.

These notes were written at the time of the Bosch overthrow. They wanted him to take the headship and he declined. To me that is testimony of great weight in showing the character of the man. Yet he is the one who was taken out of the Dominican Republic with a bayonet at his back and is now in Miami.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I am glad that the Senator gave that additional information concerning Wessin y Wessin.

As I say, I am not one of his advocates. I do not know enough about him. However, I do know that when a great many of the other military people were fleeing,

he was fighting. He was standing up. He stepped into the critical breach, precisely as the U.S. Government stepped into the breach at a critical time, and together they set back the Communists.

I do not like to reward that kind of fighting for freedom by having my government associate itself with a movement to kidnap him and take him out of the country and send him to the United States against his will.

That is far different from saying that we should put him in high office. However, that kind of concession to the Communist groups who dislike him is a failure to show the kind of stamina and stature now that was properly shown at the time the revolution began.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the notes which I made were based upon testimony given by Government witnesses—witnesses from the State Department primarily. I have these notes here. It can be readily seen that they are merely scribbled memorandums of what was said.

The Government stood firm last April. I do not know whether it is now beginning to yield to the attacks that are being made. I hope that it is not.

A coalition government which is friendly to the West will not survive. The Communists would take over in due time in the event a coalition government were established.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield about 13 minutes to me without losing his right to the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAUSCHE in the chair). Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Montana?

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DK SENATE DISCUSSION OF DOMINICAN SITUATION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there has been a good deal of discussion about the situation in the Dominican Republic. The distinguished Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has, on the basis of an analysis of hearings held before his committee, made a speech in which he gave his views on the developments inherent in the early days preceding and following our involvement.

Senator FULBRIGHT was very careful to stress that the material on which he based his speech was testimony heard by the Foreign Relations Committee. Unfortunately, except for a 15-minute interval, I was unable to attend these hear-

ings and, furthermore, I have not had the time to read the testimony, so I am unable to comment on the hearings.

There have been exceptions taken to as well as support of FULBRIGHT's remarks by various Members of the Senate. I think it should be pointed out that the chairman of the committee stated emphatically that what he said represented his own views, based on his understanding of the hearings.

As one who participated in the White House conferences on the subject of intervening in the Dominican Republic, I do not intend to say anything specific as to what went on at the meeting. But I feel that in view of the developments which have occurred over the past day or so, that it is appropriate to comment in general terms. When the difficulty occurred, the President did call the leadership and ranking members of certain committees to the White House to discuss what had happened and was happening in the Dominican Republic. He did state that there were 5,000 nationals of foreign countries in Santo Domingo of whom 1,500 were Americans. He had received urgent requests and pleas from the chiefs of the various American agencies and I believe from some foreign embassies stating that the situation was extremely dangerous and he was told that if steps were not undertaken to insure the safety of these nationals that there could well be a substantial loss of life. There was no other country prepared or capable of giving the protection which was needed at the time except the United States. The President had to make a decision involving the safety of these nationals on the basis of the cables, telephone calls, and advice which he had received. When he announced his decision at the White House Conference there was no opposition raised at that time on the matter which was discussed in great detail.

The President, on the basis of his authority as Commander in Chief and his constitutional responsibility as President in the field of foreign policy, undertook to land military forces to protect these nationals. He selected a most capable man in the person of Lieutenant General Palmer to take command of the American Forces in Santo Domingo, and he laid the matter repeatedly before the OAS as an organization. Prior to that, he had brought it to the personal attention of as many Ambassadors of the American nations as could be contacted. He was desirous, at the earliest opportunity, of shelving the initial unilateral responsibility which the United States had undertaken and gave his whole-hearted support to the creation of an Inter-American Police Force. He agreed, without hesitation, to a Brazilian becoming the overall commander of this force and the placing of General Palmer in a subordinate position under him.

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He dispatched various missions to try and bring the opposing groups together.

Finally, in the past 2 weeks, the OAS committee, which included Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker of the United States, was able to bring about a creation of an interim and provisional government under Hector Garcia Godoy. This interim government is to remain in power for 9 months. There is to be a 6-month period to try and bring some degree of stability to the Republic and in the last 3 months of the 9-month period, political campaigns are to be undertaken by means of which the Dominican people will be given the opportunity, it is hoped, to elect a government of their own choice.

All the obstacles have not been removed in the Dominican Republic, and I am of the opinion that in this uneasy though encouraging situation, there may yet be further trouble of one kind or another. However, I do think that significant progress has been made and I know that the President is very hopeful that it will be possible to reduce the OAS force still further as the Dominicans achieve a greater degree of stability. Certainly, it is his deepest desire that the situation will be ironed out so that the Dominicans themselves can assume at the earliest moment, full control of their own affairs.

This has been a most difficult and delicate situation in which the President found himself and he has done his very best, on the basis of advice he has received, to bring the matter to a head. I feel that we owe him a debt of thanks for what he has been able to accomplish and to the OAS for what it has been able to bring about in a way of a reasonable agreement looking to a secure future for the Dominican people.

I would certainly underscore what the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has time and again said, that the President's decisions were fully understandable in the light of the circumstances as they were brought to his attention. I feel, also, that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee was endeavoring to present to the Senate a thoughtful analysis of the views which he distilled from the hearings before his committee. An analysis of the circumstances surrounding major foreign policy decisions is of concern to the Senate and out of this can come constructive reactions from Senators which could well be useful in the field of foreign policy in the future. There has been some strenuous debate on the Dominican situation in this Chamber and there may well be more in the future.

In my opinion, the important thing at the moment is to recognize the fact that at long last, after a period of months, what looks like a lead to the solution has been worked out for the Dominican Republic and that solution was arrived at by the Organization of the Amer-

ican States in which we participated as a full member. A provisional government has been established. An interim President is in office. There has, according to available reports and to the best of my knowledge, been a general laying down of arms. The decision now is up to the Dominican people and the provisional government for the time being to adjust themselves to this situation to prepare for elections 9 months hence, and to establish a government based on the will of the people which can furnish and which can bring a degree of stability and economic prosperity to the Dominicans themselves. The United States has spent a large amount of money to aid in the rehabilitation of the Republic. It is prepared to continue to help if the Dominican people themselves take control of their own state and guide it to anchor in fairly calm political and economic waters. To that end the President has pledged his full support to the efforts of the OAS and I feel quite certain that the American people and their representatives in the Congress support him fully.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. I completely commend the statement of the distinguished Senator from Montana. I do not see how the President could have done anything except intervene. I believe he showed firmness in his handling of foreign relations which should commend him to the entire Nation.

I wish to make an additional point: I know he had tried before intervention to persuade the OAS to move. Apparently it moved too slowly. Since intervention, he has continued that effort. I am greatly heartened by the apparent activation, within OAS, of direct participation by many nations in the peace-keeping procedure, which for the first time, as I have observed that fine organization, indicates its willingness to come to grips with serious problems in various parts of the hemisphere.

I believe that from the leadership of the President, from his urging of the OAS, and from his taking unilateral leadership for a few days as the situation required, there will come a reactivation and rejuvenation of the OAS which will be of great importance to the entire hemisphere. His action will eventually commend itself to peace-loving people throughout the hemisphere as a wise act, because it brought about results so long desired, and only now about to be achieved.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Montana has made a forthright and fair presentation of the

situation as it prevailed in the Dominican Republic in April and as it prevails today.

I have had very little correspondence from those on either side of the situation. I have received only about 50 letters, some condemning the President for the action he took and others commanding him. The letters indicated that the writers really were not in possession of the facts and did not know exactly what the situation was. I personally believe that the President was warranted in sending forces into the Dominican Republic on the night when the rebellion started.

I also believe, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has stated, that the President received some rather poor advice, that plenty of mistakes were made, and that it probably took much longer to restore order in the Dominican Republic than would have been necessary had certain mistakes not been made.

Now, however, the OAS has accomplished its purpose. It is providing for the setting up of a government to be established by the people of the Dominican Republic themselves, and I hope that we shall not undertake to interfere with the setting up of that government, unless it actually threatens the security of the United States, which I doubt it will do.

If I were a Communist from a foreign country, looking for a place in the Western Hemisphere to locate from where I could work with safety, I would never have chosen the Dominican Republic. I believe that to be about the worst place a Communist could find anywhere for his purposes. If I were looking, I believe there would be many cities in the United States which would be more likely places than the Dominican Republic was at the time of the rebellion.

However, I believe that if the people of that Republic desire to set up a government of their own which is progressive and forward-looking, even though it meets with the disapproval of certain interested parties, we should support them and work through the Organization of American States as far as we possibly can.

I believe that the situation now is such that we can safely conclude that the Dominican Republic is going to establish its own Government, and that it will be a government with which we can work, one which will improve the economy and the security of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont and the distinguished Senator from Florida for what they both had to say. I join them in expressing hope that the Organization of American States will become a stronger, more efficient, and more effective organization in the weeks, months and years ahead.

September 17, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

23349

The distinguished Senator from Vermont was at that fateful meeting in the White House when the President informed us of the situation then developing in the Dominican Republic. Because we are both bound by the executive nature of the meeting, we cannot say too much, but we were aware of what happened at the time, and we both gave our full endorsement to the policy undertaken in connection with the President's announcement to us in the Cabinet Room.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, let me express the hope I expressed for the Dominican Republic, that it will apply to all the Latin American countries in the Western Hemisphere. I do not believe that we should undertake to dictate to them just what kind of government they should live under, or whom they should have to head that government so long as it does not actually threaten the security of the United States.

I am still not convinced that what went on in the Dominican Republic in April threatened the security of the United States. It seemed to me that there would have been more bloodshed during that rebellion had the President not intervened. However, as I said before, I believe that he received some advice, as has been pointed out by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, which caused us to make more mistakes than we otherwise might have made, and which delayed plans for the establishment of a popular government in that country.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, to some extent the discussion relates to events in the past.

Now we are faced with the present.

It seems as though there is a good possibility—although nothing is sure in this world any more—of a reasonably good government coming out of the situation in the Dominican Republic.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] for yielding to me, and if he will allow me just this once, to suggest the absence of a quorum, without his losing the right to the floor, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRIS in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its

reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9221) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes; that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 16 and 31 to the bill and concurred therein, and that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 8, 10, 24, and 62 to the bill, and concurred therein, severally with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10323) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the Vice President:

H.R. 948. An act to amend part II of the District of Columbia Code relating to divorce, legal separation, and annulment of marriage in the District of Columbia;

H.R. 5883. An act to amend the bonding provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 and the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act;

H.R. 10014. An act to amend the act of July 2, 1954, relating to office space in the districts of Members of the House of Representatives, and the act of June 27, 1956, relating to office space in the States of Senators; and

H.R. 10874. An act to amend the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 and the Railroad Retirement Tax Act to eliminate certain provisions which reduce spouses' annuities, to provide coverage for tips, to increase the base on which railroad retirement benefits and taxes are computed, and to change the railroad retirement tax rates.

AMENDMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2580) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, the bill we are considering today accomplishes major reforms in our immigration policy. This bill is not

concerned with increasing immigration to this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we apply in selection of immigrants. The basic change it makes is the elimination of the national origins quota system, in line with the recommendations of the last four Presidents of the United States, and Members of Congress from both parties.

For 41 years, the immigration policy of our country has been crippled by this system. Because of it we have never been able to achieve the annual quota use authorized by law. We have discriminated in favor of some people over others, contrary to our basic principles as a nation, simply on the basis of birth. We have separated families needlessly. We have been forced to forego the talents of many professionals whose skills were needed to cure, to teach and to enhance the lives of Americans.

The present law has caused thousands of instances of personal hardship, of which every Senator is aware. Several times Congress has tried to correct the twisted results of the national origins system through emergency legislation. Six times between 1948 and 1962 laws were passed for the admission of refugees. Four times between 1957 and 1962 we have made special provisions for relatives of American citizens or orphans. In addition, each year we are called upon to consider thousands of private bills to accommodate persons caught in the backwash of this origins system.

These efforts at circumvention are further proof that the national origins system is in disrepute. We cannot continue to respect a law we constantly seek to circumvent. To continue with such a law brings discredit upon ourselves as legislators. The national origins system has even failed in the purpose for which it was intended: to keep the ethnic balance of our country forever as it was in 1920. In 1920, 79 percent of our white population was of northern and western European origin. During the first 30 years of the national origins system, only 39 percent of our total immigration came from such areas. Since 1952, some 3.5 million persons have been admitted to this country as immigrants. Two-thirds of them came outside the national origins quota. Since 1952, we have authorized 2.1 million national origins quota numbers. Only one-half of these numbers were used.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a statistical summary of immigrants admitted from June 30, 1953, through June 30, 1964.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Immigrants admitted to the United States, by classes under the immigration laws, years ended June 30, 1953-64

Class	1953-64	1953 ¹	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960 ²	1961	1962	1963	1964
Total immigrants admitted	3,197,857	170,434	208,177	237,790	321,625	326,867	253,265	260,686	265,398	271,344	283,763	306,260	292,248
Quota immigrants (total)	1,140,479	84,175	94,098	82,232	89,810	97,178	102,153	97,657	101,373	96,104	90,319	103,036	102,844
Immigration and Nationality Act	1,124,863	78,053	88,016	79,617	88,825	97,084	102,077	97,651	101,352	96,074	90,305	102,995	102,814
1st preference quota:													
Selected immigrants of special skill or ability	80,600	77	1,429	1,776	1,946	2,992	3,941	3,518	3,385	3,460	3,313	2,288	2,475
Their spouses and children	28,676	45	1,027	1,236	1,420	2,739	3,197	3,109	3,681	3,758	3,721	2,374	2,387
Skilled agriculturists, their wives and children (1924 act)			321	321									
Parents or husbands of U.S. citizens (1924 act)	4,290	4,290											
2d preference quota:													
Parents of U.S. citizens	35,847	983	2,783	2,394	2,843	3,677	2,608	3,406	3,451	3,381	2,252	4,006	4,063
Unmarried sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ³	2,409												369
Wives and children of resident aliens (1924 act)	4,133	4,133											
3d preference quota:													
Spouses of resident aliens	28,450	291	3,180	2,604	2,902	2,848	2,719	3,400	2,767	2,132	1,786	1,832	1,980
Unmarried sons or daughters of resident aliens ⁴	36,618	220	2,824	2,821	4,064	3,783	2,668	4,134	3,225	3,265	2,419	3,266	3,929
4th preference quota:													
Brothers or sisters of U.S. citizens	22,406	63	1,556	1,955	1,690	1,715	2,903	2,162	1,956	2,346	2,162	2,187	1,711
Married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ⁵	7,928	22	374	1,120	431	1,443	2,029	1,275	425	244	205	199	161
Spouses and children of brothers or sisters, sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ⁶	11,580												
Adopted sons or daughters of U.S. citizens ⁷	137												
No preference quota	31,468	87,608	74,843	65,711	78,529	77,887	82,030	76,638	80,987	73,923	71,642	83,563	83,207
Special legislation (quota immigrants)													
Displaced persons (Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (quotas))	15,616	6,122	6,082	2,615	485	94	76	6	21	30	14	41	30
Skilled sheepherders (act of Apr. 9, 1952 (quotas))	15,121	5,759	6,082	2,615	485	94	76	6			3	1	
Foreign government officials adjusted under sec. 13, (act of Sept. 11, 1957 (quotas))	363	363											
Nonquota immigrants (total)	2,157,378	86,250	114,079	155,558	232,315	229,689	151,112	163,028	164,025	175,240	163,444	203,224	189,404
Immigration and Nationality Act	1,181,285	85,015	112,854	126,135	156,808	147,243	126,591	111,341	133,087	152,382	160,346	183,283	178,200
Wives of U.S. citizens	326,980	15,916	17,145	18,504	21,244	21,794	23,517	22,620	21,621	20,012	17,316	17,590	19,701
Husbands of U.S. citizens	73,418	3,359	7,725	6,716	6,788	5,767	5,833	6,913	6,140	6,059	6,646	6,035	6,437
Children of U.S. citizens	70,896	3,268	5,819	5,662	4,710	4,798	5,970	6,869	6,454	6,480	6,354	6,981	7,531
Natives of Western Hemisphere countries	1,227,778	68,985	78,867	92,620	122,083	111,344	86,523	66,386	89,566	110,140	130,741	144,677	135,816
Their spouses and children	27,482	2,114	1,629	1,654	1,949	2,144	2,052	1,810	2,135	2,696	2,764	3,067	3,468
Persons who had been U.S. citizens	902	104	427	87	44	58	43	22	36	15	25	23	18
Ministers of religious denominations, their spouses and children	5,107	887	385	307	350	403	435	558	485	406	451	462	478
Employees of U.S. Government abroad, their spouses and children	205	2	4	9	2	8	23	24	27	10	3	32	61
Children born abroad to resident aliens or subsequent to issuance of visa	12,117	328	358	348	412	701	926	1,228	1,458	1,411	1,495	1,611	1,843
Aliens adjusted under sec. 249, Immigration and Nationality Act ⁸	22,795	3,605	6,554	465	228	226	226	269	4,321	4,773	5,037	3,399	2,680
Other nonquota immigrants	18,944								590	392	116	152	262
Special legislation (nonquota immigrants)	176,093	1,244	1,225	29,423	75,507	82,446	25,521	51,688	30,938	22,353	24,098	19,941	11,204
Displaced persons (Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (nonquota))	-1,030	1,030											
Orphans (act of July 29, 1953)	466		399	67									
Refugees (Refugee Relief Act of 1953)	189,021		821	20,002	75,473	82,444	1,012	198	43	9	15	3	1
Skilled sheepherders (act of Sept. 3, 1954 (non- quota))	385		364	31									
Immigrants (act of Sept. 11, 1957)	61,948						24,467	24,834	6,612	3,982	1,809	213	31
Hungarian parolees (act of July 25, 1958)	30,701						25,424	5,067	122	51	20	17	
Azores and Netherlands refugees (act of Sept. 2, 1958)	22,213							1,187	8,870	5,472	4,796	1,888	
Immigrants (secs. 4 and 6, act of Sept. 22, 1959)	29,337							10,314	13,255	5,488	280		
Immigrants (act of Sept. 26, 1961)	15,525								11,912	2,848	765		
Other nonquota immigrants (special legislation)	412	214	5		3	2	42	45	82	18	27	12	12
Refugee and escapees (act of July 14, 1960)	6,111										2,005	4,106	
Immigrants (act of Oct. 24, 1962)	18,944										12,672	6,272	

¹ In 1953 figures include admissions under Immigration Act of 1924.² Prior to act of Sept. 22, 1959, all sons or daughters of U.S. citizens over 21 years of age were classified as 4th preference quota under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Adopted sons and daughters with petitions approved prior to Sept. 22, 1959, remained 4th preference.³ Prior to act of Sept. 22, 1959, included only children under 21 of resident aliens. Adopted sons or daughters of resident aliens were classified as nonpreference quota.⁴ Prior to act of Sept. 22, 1959, classified as nonpreference quota.⁵ Not reported prior to 1959.⁶ Includes 321 professors of colleges and universities their wives and children.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, from these figures, it was obvious to the Judiciary Committee that the current system is as much a failure as a device as it is an embarrassment as a doctrine. The bill now before the Senate abolishes it altogether.

The new policy in the bill before us was developed under the administration of President Kennedy by experts both in Congress and the executive branch. Extensive hearings were held, both last year and this, in the Senate and the House. The Senate Immigration Subcommittee has sat regularly since last February. We have heard over 50 witnesses. I can report, Mr. President, that opposition to this measure is minimal. Many of the private organizations who differed with us in the past now agree

the national origins system must be eliminated.

The current bill phases out the national origins system over a 3-year period. Beginning July 1, 1968, our immigration policy will be based on the concept of "first come, first served." We no longer will ask a man where he was born. Instead we will ask if he seeks to join his family, or if he can help meet the economic and social needs of the Nation. Favoritism based on nationality will disappear. Favoritism based on individual worth and qualifications will take its place.

When this system is fully in effect, 170,000 quota numbers will be available to the world, exclusive of the Western Hemisphere. Parents, spouses, and children of U.S. citizens will be considered as

"immediate relatives" and, as such, will be under no numerical limitation at all. Due to the existence of backlogs of applicants in those nations discriminated against by the national origins system, an annual limitation per country of 20,000 quota immigrants is established, so that in the short run no one nation will be able to receive an unduly disproportionate share of the quota numbers. It is anticipated that after 3 years, these backlogs of intending immigrants will be eliminated in all instances but for one category of Italians, and that situation will be rectified shortly thereafter.

The total number of authorized quotas is not increased substantially by this bill. Currently, we authorize the use of 158,561 numbers per year, but this is exclusive of refugees. Under the new

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1	Mr. Elder 7D5617			CR
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks: Attached are extracts from Friday's
Congressional Record containing the views
of several senators on the Dominican crisis.

Assistant Legislative Counsel

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